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One of the most significant questions in ethics is this: under what conditions are 
people morally responsible for what they do?  Assuming that people can only be praised 
or blamed for actions they perform of their own free will, the particular question that 
interests me is how we should understand the nature of this freedom – with what kind of 
freedom must people act, if they are to be morally responsible for what they do? 
 A natural answer to this question – and the one I think is correct – is to point to 
the freedom to do otherwise.  This is encapsulated in the principle of alternative 
possibilities (PAP), the principle that a person is morally responsible for what he has 
done only if he could have done otherwise. PAP has led many to believe that the freedom 
required for moral responsibility must be incompatible with determinism or the existence 
of God because it is plausible to argue that if determinism is true or if God exists, then 
people would lack genuine freedom of choice and hence could not be morally responsible 
for their behavior. 
 vi
In the light of two important articles by Harry Frankfurt almost four decades ago, 
which challenged the claim that moral responsibility requires the freedom to do 
otherwise, compatibilism – the opposing view that the freedom for moral responsibility is 
compatible with determinism – has experienced a resurgence.  Inspired by Frankfurt’s 
work, those wanting to reject PAP – typically compatibilists – attack the principle on two 
main grounds: directly and indirectly.  First, they have argued directly that PAP is false 
by developing alleged counterexamples to it.  Second, they have challenged PAP 
indirectly by arguing that there are alternative conceptions of freedom from freedom of 
choice that, it is claimed, are not reliant on alternative possibilities but are sufficient to 
capture the freedom required for moral responsibility. 
My dissertation evaluates these two lines of attack on PAP.  In particular, I 
attempt to defend the truth of PAP against both kinds of challenge. 
 vii
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Chapter One: Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities 
 
1.1  The Central question of the dissertation. 
Among the most significant questions in ethics is this: under what conditions are 
people morally responsible for what they do?  Assuming that people can only be praised 
or blamed for actions they perform of their own free will, the particular question that 
interests me is how to understand the nature of this freedom – with what kind of freedom 
must people act if they are to be morally responsible for what they do? 
 A natural answer to this question – and the one I think correct – is to point to what 
we might call the freedom of choice or the freedom to do otherwise.  This is the freedom 
to choose to perform one action or another, some action or none at all.  It is encapsulated 
in the following principle: 
The Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP): A person is morally responsible 
for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise.   
PAP has led many to believe that the freedom required for moral responsibility 
must be incompatible with causal determinism or with God’s existence.  For it is 
plausible to argue that if determinism is true or if God exists, then people would lack the 
freedom to do otherwise and so could not be morally responsible for their behavior. 
 Almost four decades ago, Harry Frankfurt published two papers, ‘Alternate 
possibilities and moral responsibility’ (1969) and ‘Freedom of the will and the concept of 
a person’ (1971), that dramatically changed the subsequent study of free will and moral 
responsibility.  In the light of these two important articles, compatiblism – the opposing 
view that the freedom required for moral responsibility is compatible with determinism or 
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God’s existence – has experienced a resurgence.  Inspired by Frankfurt’s work, those 
wanting to attack PAP – typically compatibilists – have done so on two main grounds: 
directly and indirectly.1 
First, they have argued directly that PAP is false by developing alleged 
counterexamples to it, the most common of which are known as ‘Frankfurt cases’ (from 
Frankfurt, 1969).  In these examples, a person acts apparently freely and responsibly 
despite being prevented from doing otherwise by a counterfactual intervener – that is, by 
someone who would have intervened had the person been about to act differently.  
Second, PAP rejecters have challenged the principle indirectly by arguing that there are 
alternative conceptions of freedom from the freedom to do otherwise that, they claim, are 
not reliant on alternative possibilities but are sufficient to capture the freedom required 
for moral responsibility.  My dissertation, in the broadest strokes, is a defense of the 
claim that moral responsibility requires the freedom to do otherwise against these two 
lines of attack. 
 
1.2  The Importance of the debate about PAP and Frankfurt’s arguments. 
 Incompatibilists have tended to argue that moral responsibility is incompatible 
with the truth of determinism as follows:  
 
1 Not all those wanting to reject PAP are compatibilists.  Some incompatibilists, like 
Derk Pereboom (2001), argue that PAP is false because they ground their 
incompatibilism not on the claim that moral responsibility requires the freedom to do 
otherwise, but on the idea that it requires that the person is a genuine source of his 
behavior, something they believe the truth of determinism would eliminate.  Also, not all 
modern compatibilists want to reject PAP.  Some still follow the traditional compatibilist 
idea of interpreting the freedom to do otherwise in compatibilist-friendly ways.  
 3
                                                                                                                                                
The Traditional Incompatibilist Argument: 
(1) A person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have 
done otherwise. 
(2) The freedom to do otherwise is incompatible with the truth of causal 
determinism. 
(3) Therefore, moral responsibility is incompatible with the truth of causal 
determinism.2 
 Up until Frankfurt’s papers, compatibilists and incompatibilists largely agreed 
that premise (1) was true.  That is, the truth of PAP was generally common ground.  What 
was open to question, though, was premise (2), whether or not the freedom to do 
otherwise is incompatible with causal determinism.  This premise has struck many as 
obvious and intuitive.  More recently, incompatibilists argued for its truth by way of what 
has come to be called the consequence argument (see, for instance, Ginet, 1990 and van 
Inwagen, 1983 for formalized versions).  Roughly, the argument is this.  If determinism is 
true, then facts about the past and the laws of nature jointly entail facts about people’s 
present actions.  But since (i) people have no choice about either the facts about the past 
or the laws of nature, and (ii) if they have no choice about these, then they have no choice 
about things that are entailed by these facts, then (iii) if determinism is true, people have 
no choice – no freedom to do otherwise – with respect to their present actions. 
 
However, the bulk of PAP-rejecters have been compatibilists and they will be my main 
focus in the dissertation. 
2 A similar argument can be made to show that moral responsibility is incompatible with 
God’s existence on the grounds that the freedom to do otherwise is incompatible with 
either God determining our behavior or His having complete foreknowledge of it. 
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 Compatibilists, who prior to Frankfurt’s papers had generally agreed with 
incompatibilists that PAP is true, typically responded to the traditional incompatibilist 
argument by claiming that the freedom to do otherwise, when properly understood, is 
compatible with the truth of determinism after all.  To make this case, these so called 
classical compatibilists offered an analysis of the freedom to do otherwise in conditional 
terms (see Ayer, 1954 and Moore, 1912 for defenses of this view).  According to the 
conditional analysis in its most promising form, to say that a person is free to do 
otherwise is to say that he would have done otherwise, if he had wanted to.  Armed with 
this kind of analysis, compatibilists argued that the freedom to do otherwise can be 
properly analyzed in ways that do not conflict with determinism, and efforts to argue 
otherwise – by way of the consequence argument, for instance – fail once we understand 
the idea of ‘having a choice’ about something in compatibilist-friendly terms. 
Such classical compatibilists then argued that premise (2) of the traditional 
incompatibilist argument is false because a person would be free to do otherwise in the 
conditional sense even if determinism were true.  With respect to the incompatibilists’ 
argument that premise (2) is true – the consequence argument – compatibilists argued 
that if we understand a person’s ‘having a choice’ about something in these conditional 
terms, then the consequence argument is unsound.  Even though people would not have a 
choice, in this sense, about facts about the past and the laws of nature (it is not true that if 
a person wanted to change facts about the past or the laws of nature, he would have done 
so), this would not entail that they do not have a choice, in the conditional sense, about 
their present actions.  After all, it seems plausible to think that people have the freedom to 
do otherwise in the sense that they would have done otherwise, if they had wanted to. 
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The problem with these classical compatibilist responses is that the conditional 
analysis of the freedom to do otherwise on which they rest is untenable, as almost all now 
agree.  Even many prominent contemporary compatibilists concede this point.3  First, 
counterexamples have been offered designed to show that the conditional analysis is not 
sufficient for the freedom to do otherwise.  Michael McKenna (2004) – following 
Roderick Chisholm (1964) – describes a case in which a young woman, Danielle, is 
psychologically incapable of wanting to touch a blond haired dog because of an earlier 
childhood trauma.  He imagines that on her sixteenth birthday, her father presents her 
with a black haired dog and a blond haired dog and tells her that she must pick one to 
keep (she has been wanting a pet for some time).  Danielle happily picks the black haired 
dog. 
 Was Danielle free to do otherwise and pick the blond haired dog?  It seems not 
since her childhood trauma has left her psychologically incapable of forming a desire for 
blond haired dogs.  So she was not free to do otherwise and pick that dog.  Yet Danielle 
would appear to satisfy the conditions of the conditional analysis.  It seems right to say of 
her that if she had wanted to pick the blond haired dog, she would have done so.  Her 
problem, of course, is that, given the scarring effects of her childhood trauma, it is not 
psychologically open to her to want to pick that dog.  So, satisfying the conditional 
analysis, as Danielle does, is not sufficient for having the freedom to do otherwise.4 
 
3 Michael McKenna (2004) and John Martin Fischer (Fischer, Kane, Pereboom & 
Vargas, 2007), for instance, makes this concession. 
4 One might try to avoid this problem by adding to the conditional analysis the 
requirement that it must be true to say of the person that she could have wanted to act 
differently (that, in Danielle’s case, she could have wanted to pick the blond haired dog).  
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Second, J. L. Austin (1979) pointed out that what is often meant in saying that a 
person is free to do otherwise does not seem to be captured by saying that if he had 
desired to act in some other way, he would have acted in that way.  By using the example 
of a golfer who tries but misses a putt, Austin argues that what we mean when we say 
that the golfer could have holed the putt (he was free to do otherwise than he did) is not 
that he would have holed it if conditions have been different (though that may be so).  
What we mean is that he could have holed it given the conditions as they were at that 
moment.5  According to Austin, then, what we mean when we speak of someone as being 
free to do otherwise is not captured by the traditional compatibilist conditional analysis. 
Some (e.g., Ekstrom, 2000 and Kane, 1996) argue that Austin’s example shows 
that satisfying the conditional analysis is not necessary for having the freedom to do 
otherwise.  Suppose in saying that the golfer could have done otherwise, we mean to 
imply that he could have holed the putt.  According to the conditional analysis, to say he 
was free to hole the putt is to say that he would have holed it, if he had wanted to.  
However, this does not seem true of the golfer.  As evidence, consider the fact that, in the 
actual circumstances, he did want to hole the putt but he did not do so – he missed.  So it 
 
But this just seems to push back the question of how to understand the term ‘could have’ 
to a higher level, i.e., what does it mean to say that a person ‘could have wanted to act 
differently’?  Alternatively, one might require that the person not be subject to 
psychological compulsion, hypnosis, subliminal advertising, and so on – factors which 
would prevent a person from being able to form a desire to act differently.  But, as 
Fischer (Fischer, Kane, Pereboom & Vargas 2007: 51-52) – a prominent modern 
compatibilist – points out, there seems little chance of supplying a principled criterion for 
deciding what circumstances should go into such a list. 
5 Austin (1979) writes, “Consider the case where I miss a very short putt and kick myself 
because I could have holed it.  It is not that I should have holed it if I had tried: I did try, 
and missed.  It is not that I should have holed it if conditions had been different: that 
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does not seem right to say that if he had desired to hole the putt, he would have done so.  
The golfer has the freedom to do otherwise and hole the putt (it seems) without satisfying 
the conditional analysis.  This demonstrates that satisfying the conditional analysis is not 
necessary for people to be free to do otherwise. 
The way this dialectic has unfolded has led many to believe that incompatibilism 
is in the stronger position than compatibilism.  So long as all parties generally agree that 
moral responsibility requires the freedom to do otherwise, it has seemed to many more 
plausible to argue that this kind of freedom is incompatible with the truth of determinism 
or God’s existence than to argue that it is not.  Frankfurt’s arguments against PAP are 
important, and have attracted so much attention, because they offer a new way for 
compatibilists to respond to the traditional incompatibilist argument.  Armed with 
Frankfurt’s arguments, compatibilists can simply deny premise (1), the claim that moral 
responsibility requires the freedom to do otherwise.  Compatibilists would no longer be 
saddled with the burden of providing a convincing analysis of the freedom to do 
otherwise that is consistent with the truth of determinism.  To this extent, compatibilism 
becomes a much more attractive option, should Frankfurt’s attack on PAP be true. 
 If Frankfurt’s argument against PAP is sound, then incompatibilists would be 
deprived of their traditional argument.  It would not matter whether or not the freedom to 
do otherwise is incompatible with determinism, for this kind of freedom would not be 
required for moral responsibility.  Incompatibilism would no longer occupy the intuitive 
 
might be of course be so, but I am talking about conditions precisely as they were, 
asserting that I could have holed it.  There is the rub” (p. 218, footnote 1). 
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‘high ground’ over compatibilism.  To this extent, incompatibilism would become a 
much less appealing option. 
 Some incompatibilists suggest that not all would be lost in such a situation.  Some 
(e.g., Pereboom, 2001) have argued that the success of Frankfurt’s direct attack on PAP 
in particular need not undermine incompatibilism per se.  These philosophers argue that 
the traditional incompatibilist argument should not be the main argument for 
incompatibilism.  Moral responsibility does not require the freedom to do otherwise, they 
insist, but rather the freedom to be the genuine source of one’s actions.  Consider the 
following argument: 
  The Source Incompatibilist Argument: 
(1) A person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he is the genuine 
source of his actions. 
(2) The freedom to be a genuine source of one’s actions is incompatible with the 
truth of causal determinism. 
(3) Therefore, moral responsibility is incompatible with the truth of causal 
determinism. 
 So called ‘source’ incompatibilists argue that Frankfurt’s direct argument, if 
successful, would not undermine incompatibilism properly construed.  In fact, these 
incompatibilists may well be amenable to his direct attack on PAP to the extent that it 
would help shift incompatibilism away from the thought that moral responsibility 
requires the freedom to opt between alternative courses of action and to the claim they 
prioritize, the claim that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he is 
the genuine source of his behavior.  Of course, these incompatibilists would not be in 
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complete agreement with Frankfurt’s indirect attack on PAP.  They would agree with him 
that there is an alternative conception of freedom from freedom of choice that is 
sufficient to capture the freedom required for moral responsibility.  However, they part 
company from Frankfurt in believing that this freedom is not compatible with the truth of 
determinism.6 
 Having motivated the importance of the debate surrounding PAP, I now outline 
my defense of the principle as it proceeds in each chapter of my dissertation. 
 
1.3  Summary of chapters.   
Chapter two – ‘Frankfurt’s Direct Attack on PAP – The Frankfurt Cases.’ 
 In chapter two, I introduce the Frankfurt cases. Consider the following example, 
similar to one Frankfurt develops in ‘Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility’ 
(1969).  Imagine a person, Jones, decides to lie to save embarrassing himself, despite 
knowing that it is morally wrong for him to do this.  Unbeknownst to Jones, he is unable 
to do otherwise because of the presence of Black.  Black is a counterfactual intervener, 
someone who could and would intervene to make Jones lie, if Jones had not decided to 
lie ‘on his own.’  But, since Jones acted ‘on his own,’ without Black needing to intervene, 
it seems right to think that Jones is blameworthy for lying despite lacking the freedom to 
do otherwise.  Hence, PAP is false. 
 
6 I am inclined to reject source incompatibilism and think that incompatibilism should be 
argued for via the truth of PAP rather than appealing to the idea of a person being the 
genuine source of his actions.  I offer no direct argument for this claim in the dissertation.  
However, I argue for it, albeit obliquely and incompletely, in chapters six and seven by 
suggesting that we can make good sense of the idea that a person is a genuine source, or 
author, of his behavior even if determinism were true. 
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 I reject such cases because I think they fall prey to a dilemma, both horns of 
which undermine their cogency.  Either Jones’ decision to lie is causally determined or it 
is not.  On the one hand, if it is determined, then the example begs the question against 
the incompatibilist who does not think that determinism is compatible with moral 
responsibility from the outset.  On the other hand, if Jones’ decision to lie is not causally 
determined, then Jones would have alternative possibilities after all, as PAP requires.  
This is because, since Jones’ decision is not determined, Black will have to wait until 
Jones has begun to decide one way or the other, to lie or not to lie, to know whether or 
not he needs to intervene.  But this waiting allows Jones to have alternative possibilities 
at the moment of choice, lying or not lying.  And if Black should intervene before Jones 
has begun to decide, then Black, but not Jones, would be morally responsible for the 
decision. 
 This dilemma was originally developed by Robert Kane (1985), Carl Ginet 
(1996), and David Widerker (1995).  Since then, those wanting to reject PAP have 
responded in two ways.  Some (e.g., Fischer 1999, 2006 and Haji & McKenna 2004) 
have argued that a causally determined Frankfurt case can be used to show that PAP is 
false without begging the question against the incompatibilist.  Others (e.g., Mele & 
Robb 1998, 2003 and Pereboom 2001, 2005) have suggested that there can be cases in 
which a person’s action is not determined yet the intervener eliminates all of the person’s 
genuine or robust alternative possibilities.  In this chapter, I extend the original dilemma 
defense by arguing that these new lines of defense of Frankfurt’s conclusion are 
unpersuasive and fall prey to the original dilemma.  I thus conclude that the Frankfurt 
cases do not show that PAP is false. 
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Chapter three – ‘Raising the Responsibility Question.’ 
 Recently PAP-defenders have developed a different line of response to the 
Frankfurt cases.  They have begun to question the very intuition that Jones should be 
thought to act freely and responsibly in the first place.  They have, as I put it, raised the 
responsibility question with respect to Jones’ blameworthiness.  In his original 1969 
paper, Frankfurt argues that since the fact that Jones could not have done otherwise is 
irrelevant to causally explaining Jones’ behavior – he would, it seems, have done the 
same thing for the same reasons even if Black had not been present and he could have 
done otherwise – then it would be gratuitous to assign this fact any weight in the 
assessment of his moral responsibility.  In the first part of the chapter, I critically examine 
this argument. 
 In the second part of the chapter, I assess why PAP seems so intuitive.  This is 
important in the context of raising the responsibility question for some PAP-adherents 
have suggested that Jones should not be thought to act freely and responsibly, in the 
Frankfurt case, precisely because he could not have done otherwise.  But for such a move 
to be plausible, it would be helpful to have an account of PAP’s plausibility, to have a 
justification for PAP itself.  I outline a recent argument for PAP’s truth by Widerker 
(2000, 2005) which rests on the claim that unless there is a good answer to the question 
‘What should Jones have done instead?’ then Jones cannot be blameworthy for what he 
does.  I end the chapter by defending this argument against some recent criticisms by 




Chapter four – ‘Frankfurt’s Indirect Attack on PAP – The Hierarchical Account.’ 
 In chapter four, I turn to Frankfurt’s indirect attack on PAP developed in the 
second of his two important papers, ‘Freedom of the will and the concept of a person’ 
(1971).  In this indirect attack, he argues that there is an alternative conception of 
freedom different from the freedom to do otherwise.  He claims that this alternative 
conception which is compatible with determinism does not rely on alternative 
possibilities yet is sufficient to capture the freedom required for moral responsibility.  If 
Frankfurt is right, then PAP is false. 
 In the main part of the chapter, I outline and discuss Frankfurt’s condition of the 
freedom required for moral responsibility which turns on distinguishing between higher-
order and lower-order desires.  Specifically, Frankfurt argues that a person acts with the 
freedom required for moral responsibility if and only if he acts from a desire that is his 
will – that is, is his motivating desire – because it was the will he wanted.  I try to place 
Frankurt’s account in a broader context by showing that the reason Frankfurt 
distinguishes between higher-order and lower-order desires is to explain how some of a 
person’s desires can be more truly ‘his’ than others.  After outlining the theoretical 
background on which his account rests, I end the chapter by looking at Frankfurt’s 
neglected example of the willing drug addict, a case that throws further light on 
Frankfurt’s theory. 
 
Chapter five – ‘Evaluating Frankfurt’s Hierarchical Account.’ 
 Having offered what I think is the most plausible interpretation of Frankfurt’s 
positive account of the freedom required for moral responsibility, I then turn in chapter 
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five to evaluate it.  I focus on two criticisms.  First, I assess whether a person must 
identify himself with his motivating desire in order to be morally responsible as Frankfurt 
suggests.  I focus in particular on apparent counterexamples that suggest that 
identification is not necessary, though I argue that Frankfurt and his defenders have the 
apparatus to avoid these alleged counterexamples. 
 Assuming that identification is necessary for responsibility, the second criticism I 
look at focuses on whether Frankfurt’s condition is sufficient to capture the way in which 
a morally responsible agent identifies himself with his motivating desire.  I argue that this 
criticism is much more troubling for Frankfurt’s account than the first one.  Criticisms 
that Frankfurt’s condition is not sufficient for identification are not rare, but I try to break 
new ground by arguing that his account is not subject to one regress difficulty, as is 
commonly argued, but to two independent regress problems.  I assess Frankfurt’s 
responses over the years to this sort of criticism. 
 
Chapter six – ‘Undermining New Compatibilism I – Manipulation and Causal 
Responsibility.’ 
 In the final two chapters of the dissertation, I turn away from Frankfurt’s specific 
account and look more generally at compatibilist views that try to capture moral 
responsibility’s freedom without reference to alternative possibilities, so called new 
compatibilist views.  Besides Frankfurt’s account, I consider the new compatibilist views 
of John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza (1998), T. M. Scanlon (1998), Angela Smith 
(2005, 2008), R. Jay Wallace (1994), and Gary Watson (1975). 
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 Generally speaking, these new compatibilist views that do not make use of the 
freedom to do otherwise can be divided into two kinds depending on whether they 
emphasize self-expression or responsiveness to reasons as the key freedom-relevant 
feature of moral responsibility.  On the self-expression model, people act with the 
freedom required for moral responsibility to the extent that their actions reflect the parts 
of their selves that are most fundamental to who they really are, as people.  On the 
responsiveness to reasons picture, people act with the freedom required for moral 
responsibility to the extent that they regulate their behavior by moral reasons. 
 In this chapter, I outline and evaluate two strategies by which PAP might be 
defended in the face of these new compatibilist conditions.  The first involves 
manipulation cases, while the second exploits the apparent difference between causal 
responsibility and moral responsibility.  Despite my sympathies with the aims of these 
arguments, however, I conclude that neither forms a decisive strike against the 
sufficiency of the new compatibilist conditions. 
 
Chapter seven – ‘Undermining New Compatibilism II – Blame, Demands, and 
Authorship.’ 
 In this final chapter, I develop an argument for PAP’s truth based on some recent 
work by Widerker (2005).  It draws on the apparent link between moral blame on the one 
hand and moral demands on the other.  I suggest the following principle: 
The Principle of Alternative Demands (PAD): An agent S is morally blameworthy 
for doing A only if in the circumstances it would be reasonable for those in a 
position to do so to demand that S not have done A. 
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PAD supports the claim that blame requires alternative possibilities because in 
order for it to be reasonable for such a demand to be made it must be the case that the 
individual could have done otherwise.  For how can it be reasonable to make demands of 
people if it is not within their power to meet those demands? 
If sound, this argument shows that the new compatibilist conditions are not 
sufficient to capture the freedom required for moral responsibility, at least as it applies to 
moral blame.  But the argument has broader implications.  It shows that a traditional 
assumption about the relationship between freedom and moral responsibility is false.  
According to this traditional assumption, the issue of a person’s freedom as it pertains to 
his moral responsibility is simply the issue of determining the kind of freedom needed for 
him to bring about, or ‘author,’ his behavior.  Yet this argument shows that there is more 
to delineating a person’s freedom when assessing his moral responsibility than simply 
determining this.  In addition, we must also ask whether the individual acted with 
sufficient freedom for it to be reasonable to demand that he not have acted as he did and, 










                                                
Chapter Two: Frankfurt’s Direct Attack on PAP – The Frankfurt Cases. 
 
 In this chapter, I defend the truth of PAP against apparent counterexamples to it.  
These alleged counterexamples, known as ‘Frankfurt cases’ from Frankfurt’s (1969) 
well-known presentation of them, have convinced many that moral responsibility does 
not require the freedom to do otherwise.  Here, I develop and defend one particular 
objection to the Frankfurt cases known as the dilemma defense of PAP.  According to this 
line of defense, these examples fall prey to a dilemma, both horns of which undermine 
their cogency. 
 
2.1  The Frankfurt cases. 
 Here is an example of a Frankfurt case.7  Imagine a person, Jones, decides to lie 
to save embarrassing himself, despite knowing that it is morally wrong for him to do this.  
Unbeknownst to Jones, he is unable to do otherwise because of the presence of Black.  
Black is a counterfactual intervener, someone who could and would intervene to make 
Jones lie, if Jones had not decided to lie ‘on his own.’  But, as Frankfurt (1969) argues in 
his original article, ‘Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility,’ since Black’s 
presence has no effect on what Jones did – Jones would, it seems, have done the same 
thing for the same reasons even if Black had not been present and Jones could have done 
otherwise – it seems right to think that Jones is blameworthy, and hence morally 
responsible, for lying despite lacking the freedom to do otherwise.  Hence, PAP is false. 
 
7 This case is similar to one outlined by Haji & McKenna (2004). 
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 As Frankfurt (1969) himself acknowledges, though, the example is 
underdescribed in its original form (p. 835, footnote 3).  This is because we can ask how 
Black can have the counterfactual power to ensure that Jones can only decide how Black 
wants him to.  In the case as it is initially presented, should Jones, in the counterfactual 
scenario, decide not to lie, then it seems that Black can only intervene and ‘make’ Jones 
decide to lie after Jones has begun to decide not to lie.  There is no way for Black to 
know that he needs to intervene until that point.  But the fact that Black can only 
intervene at this point in the counterfactual scenario, after Jones has begun to decide not 
to lie, seems to ensure that, in the actual circumstances, Jones has alternative possibilities 
at the moment of choice, lying or not lying. 
 The examples have been subsequently refined to avoid this problem by using the 
idea of a ‘sign’ Jones displays just prior to his deciding to lie. We can imagine that Jones 
is of a nervous disposition and just before any instance in which he decides to do 
something that he knows to be morally wrong – in this case, deciding to lie to save 
embarrassment – he involuntarily twitches.  Black knows this fact about Jones and can 
use it to ensure that Jones has no choice but to decide to lie.  This is because Black knows 
that the circumstances are such that should Jones be about to decide to lie, he will 
involuntarily twitch just prior to making the decision.  But should Jones be about to 
decide not to lie, he will not twitch before the decision.  With this knowledge, Black 
notices, in the actual circumstances, that Jones twitches and so Black stays hidden, 
knowing that Jones will decide just as Black wants him to.  Had he not detected a twitch, 
then Black could have prevented Jones from doing anything other than deciding to lie 
 18
because he would have intervened and ‘made’ Jones decide to lie before Jones could have 
decided not to lie.  
 These prior sign examples ensure that Black, the fail-safe mechanism, has 
sufficient counterfactual power to rule out Jones’ alternative possibilities prior to the 
beginning of a freely willed action.  However, some have suggested that even in these 
new circumstances, Jones still would have an alternative possibility open to him that 
Black cannot eliminate – the alternative, for instance, not to twitch.  But even if this were 
true, the availability of this alternative, being an involuntary twitch, would not be 
something that would be within Jones’ voluntary control.  Furthermore, it seems intuitive 
to think that if an alternative possibility is to be cited as partly explaining why a person is 
morally responsible for what he does, it must have a certain character.  Namely, it cannot 
be such that it would be outside the scope of the person’s voluntary control.  As John 
Martin Fischer (Fischer, Kane, Pereboom & Vargas 2007) puts this intuition:  
… just as it is not enough to secure moral responsibility that a different choice 
could have randomly happened, it does not seem to be enough to secure moral 
responsibility that …  [the absence of the prior sign] could have been exhibited 
involuntarily. … How could  something as important as moral responsibility 
come from something so thin – and  something entirely involuntary? (pp. 58-59).   
Descriptions of this intuition give rise to the following principle: 
The Robustness Principle: 
If an alternative possibility is to be legitimately cited as partly explaining why a 
person is morally responsible for his action, then that alternative must be one that 
is within the person’s voluntary control. 
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In what follows I take the robustness principle to be an important restriction that 
PAP defenders should abide by in responding to Frankfurt cases. 
 
2.2  The Dilemma defense. 
 Assuming that defenders of PAP should adhere to the robustness principle, how 
else might they respond to Frankfurt’s example besides pointing to the presence of 
involuntary alternatives?  There is an additional problem, I believe, with Frankfurt’s 
example and all other so called Frankfurt examples.  They all fall prey to a dilemma, both 
horns of which undermine their cogency.  According to the dilemma, the cases either beg 
the question against the incompatibilist or they fail to describe circumstances in which 
the fail-safe mechanism (Black, in the original example) eliminates all of the person’s 
robust alternative possibilities.  (By speaking of his ‘robust alternative possibilities’ I 
mean those that are within the scope of his voluntary control for it is only the existence of 
these alternatives I am assuming, and not any involuntary possibilities, that could bear on 
the question of his moral responsibility.) 
 The dilemma turns on whether or not the involuntary twitch Jones displays prior 
to his decision to lie is deterministically related to his subsequent decision to lie.  On one 
horn of the dilemma – the indeterminism horn – if the twitch is not deterministically 
related to Jones’ subsequent decision, then Black will not have an exact basis for 
knowing how Jones will decide.  For if the twitch is not deterministically related to 
Jones’ subsequent decision, then upon displaying the sign, it will still be open what 
decision (if any) Jones will make.  In such circumstances, Black will have to wait until 
after Jones has begun to decide one way or the other, to lie or not to lie, in order to know 
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whether or not he needs to intervene.  However, his waiting ensures that, at the moment 
of choice, Jones could have done otherwise.  If Black were to intervene before Jones has 
begun to make a decision one way or the other, then he, but not Jones, would be morally 
responsible for the decision. 
 On the other horn of the dilemma – the determinism horn – if the twitch is 
deterministically related to the decision itself, then while Black would have an exact basis 
for knowing which way Jones will decide, it would beg the question against 
incompatibilists to argue that Jones could be morally responsible under such 
circumstances despite lacking alternative possibilities.  For if Jones’ decision has a 
deterministic cause, then incompatibilists cannot, from the outset, think that Jones is 
morally responsible for his decision.  
 This line of defense against the Frankfurt cases, known as the ‘dilemma defense,’ 
was originally developed by Robert Kane (1985) and subsequently taken up by Carl 
Ginet (1996) and David Widerker (1995).  Since then, those wanting to reject PAP have 
responded in two ways.  Some (e.g., Fischer 1999, 2006, and Haji & McKenna 2004) 
have argued that a causally determined Frankfurt case can be used to show that PAP is 
false without begging the question against the incompatibilist.  Others (e.g., Mele & 
Robb 1998, 2003 and Pereboom 2001, 2005) have suggested that there can be cases in 
which the prior sign is not deterministically related to the person’s subsequent action yet 
the fail-safe mechanism eliminates all of the person’s robust alternative possibilities.  In 
what follows, I extend the original dilemma defense by arguing that these new lines of 
response to it are unpersuasive and fall prey to the original dilemma.  I thus conclude that 
the Frankfurt cases, even in their recently revised form, do not show that PAP is false. 
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2.3  The Determinism horn.  
With respect to the determinism horn of the dilemma defense, Haji and McKenna 
(2004) have recently argued that the question-begging charge, and the dialectic 
surrounding it, is subtler than has been appreciated.  They distinguish between two 
different audiences to whom Frankfurt’s argument can be directed.  These correspond to, 
what Haji and McKenna call, two different “dialectical contexts” (p. 302).  They believe 
that these two different dialectical contexts give rise to two different readings of the 
question-begging charge.  On the one hand, they admit that the charge may be pertinent 
in one of the contexts, what they call the broad context in which Frankfurt is trying to 
persuade the committed incompatibilist that PAP is false.  On the other hand, they argue 
that there is reason to believe that the question-begging charge is not sound in the other 
context, the narrow context in which Frankfurt intends to convince an audience that is 
undecided about compatibilism or incompatibilism that PAP is false.8   
Turning to the broad dialectical context in which Frankfurt intends to convince a 
committed incompatibilist that moral responsibility does not require the freedom to do 
otherwise, Haji and McKenna agree that “the Dilemma Defender is entitled to the 
complaint that the first horn of the dilemma [assuming determinism] is question-begging” 
(p. 313).  This is because if the Frankfurt cases are to persuade a committed 
incompatibilist that PAP is false, then they cannot assume the truth of a condition, the 
condition of determinism, that the incompatibilist believes rules out Jones’ being 
 
8 I am setting aside another possible dialectical context in which Frankfurt means to 
persuade a traditional compatibilist that PAP is false.  This is a compatibilist who 
believes that moral responsibility requires the freedom to do otherwise but understands 
this freedom in compatibilist-friendly terms. 
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blameworthy for lying in the first place.  In the broad dialectical context, in which 
Frankfurt is trying to convince a committed incompatibilist that PAP is false, “it should 
be clear that the Dilemma Defender’s appeal to the first horn is unimpeachable; it is 
simply a condition of the debate that the Frankfurt Defender offer a case that does not 
assume determinism” (p. 304).  If Frankfurt and his defenders want to work within the 
broad dialectical context of trying to convince committed incompatibilists that PAP is 
false, then they must – Haji and McKenna agree – offer an example that does not assume 
determinism (as, for instance, Mele and Robb [1998] and Pereboom [2001, 2005] do, 
examples I discuss later in this chapter).9 
But turning to the narrow dialectical context, in which Frankfurt means to 
persuade an audience that is undecided about compatibilism or incompatibilism that PAP 
is false, Haji and McKenna insist the situation is different.  In this context, those 
defending the dilemma cannot legitimately assert that a determined Frankfurt case is 
 
9 However, Haji and McKenna argue that not all incompatibilists are entitled to assert the 
broad interpretation of the first horn.  An incompatibilist whose sole reason for thinking 
that determinism is incompatible with moral responsibility is that determinism eliminates 
alternative possibilities would be behaving in “bad faith” (p. 312), Haji and McKenna 
argue, should he claim that assuming determinism begs the question simply because a 
deterministic relation obtains.  This is because “by demanding that Frankfurt begin with a 
case of a libertarian free agent … he is demanding that Frankfurt provide a case in which 
any freely willing and morally responsible agent does have alternative possibilities.  This 
of course is just what Frankfurt wants to disprove” (p. 313).  Haji and McKenna argue 
that if this sort of incompatibilist wants to rely on the dilemma defense, he “must accept 
the conditions of the debate established by the narrow dialectical context” (p. 312).  By 
contrast, Haji and McKenna claim that those incompatibilists who believe that 
determinism is incompatible with freedom and moral responsibility for other reasons than 
determinism’s apparent elimination of alternative possibilities – those who believe, for 
instance, that determinism is incompatible with a person being the genuine source of his 
actions, something that is required for moral responsibility – can, in good faith, assert the 
broad interpretation of the determinism horn of the dilemma defense.  I set this 
complication aside in what follows. 
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question-begging simply because a deterministic relation obtains simpliciter.  An 
audience that is undecided about the truth of compatibilism or incompatibilism should 
not, on the face of it, find the fact that Jones’ decision is determined by his prior sign 
objectionable with respect to the issue of his blameworthiness.  This is because they have 
no commitments about whether determinism is compatible or incompatible with moral 
responsibility.  
 However, Haji and McKenna argue that there is another version of the question-
begging charge potentially available to those defending the dilemma, one that does not 
rely on the fact that what is allegedly question-begging in the cases is that a deterministic 
relation obtains simpliciter.  On this alternative picture, the question-begging feature of 
causally determined Frankfurt cases is not simply that determinism is assumed but rather 
than “the deterministic relation expunges alternative possibilities” (p. 303).  That is, the 
dilemma defender could argue that assuming a determined relationship between the sign 
and Jones’ decision begs the question against the incompatibilist for the following reason.  
If determinism is incompatible with the freedom to do otherwise as incompatibilists 
maintain, then should the undecided audience grant that it is possible for Jones to be 
blameworthy prior to Black’s introduction into the example, they will have shown 
themselves to have granted Frankfurt’s point, that moral responsibility does not require 
the freedom to do otherwise, from the beginning.  As Haji and McKenna put it: 
If an undecided audience grants that such an agent [in a deterministic setting] is 
even prima facie free and morally responsible without the machinery [i.e., Black’s 
presence], as incompatibilists might see it, this audience will have been duped 
into granting Frankfurt’s point [that PAP is false] at the outset (p. 306).   
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So, on this version of the question-begging charge, “to insure an important 
question is not begged,” Frankfurt and his defenders “need a case in which the only 
manner of ruling out alternative possibilities is by way of the counterfactual intervener” 
(p. 309). 
 However, Haji and McKenna argue that this demand is too strong.  While they 
admit that it would be question-begging against the incompatibilist if Frankfurt were to 
use a determined example to try to persuade committed incompatibilists that PAP is false, 
they do not believe that it is question-begging to use such a case to persuade an 
undecided audience of this conclusion, even if the question-begging charge centers upon 
determinism’s elimination of Jones’ alternative possibilities.10 
 
2.4  Criticizing Haji and McKenna. 
Haji and McKenna (2004) argue that a determined Frankfurt case can be used 
without impropriety to persuade an audience who are undecided about compatibilism or 
incompatibilism that PAP is false because even if determinism eliminates Jones’ freedom 
to do otherwise as incompatibilists claim, there are reasons to think that this would be 
irrelevant to the question of Jones’ blameworthiness.  They argue as follows:  
(1) The counterfactual intervener, Black, and causal determinism are individually 
sufficient to eliminate Jones’ freedom to do otherwise. 
 
10 Though they agree that “the Frankfurt Defender’s case would be more convincing – 
there would be less to contest – if it were beyond dispute that an agent’s alternatives were 
ruled out only by virtue of the counterfactual intervener and not by virtue of the truth of 
determinism” (pp. 309-310). 
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(2) Black’s elimination of Jones’ freedom to do otherwise is irrelevant to the 
question of his blameworthiness. 
(3) Therefore, it is plausible to think that determinism’s elimination of Jones’ 
freedom to do otherwise is similarly irrelevant to the question of his 
blameworthiness.11 
In other words, even if determinism eliminates a person’s freedom to do 
otherwise as incompatibilists contend, so does Black, the counterfactual intervener.  
Furthermore, since Black’s elimination of Jones’ alternative possibilities is irrelevant to 
the question of his moral responsibility, then determinism’s elimination of his alternative 
possibilities should similarly be irrelevant to the issue of Jones’ moral responsibility. 
However, in my paper, ‘New distinctions, same troubles: a reply to Haji and 
McKenna’ (2005), I argue that this argument is not sound.  Premise (1) is false.  Causal 
determinism and the counterfactual intervener are not individually sufficient to eliminate 
Jones’ freedom to do otherwise.  Only determinism is, in itself, sufficient for eliminating 
 
11 Haji and McKenna (2004) write that “even if determinism rules out alternative 
possibilities,” as incompatibilists maintain, “so does the presence of Frankfurt’s 
counterfactual machinery.”  And since all agree that “the latter way of ruling out 
alternatives is irrelevant to an evaluation of an agent’s freedom and responsibility” – 
Jones would, it seems, have done the same thing for the same reasons even if Black had 
not been present and he could have done otherwise – this fact “provides plausible 
grounds for the suggestion that the former is as well” (p. 313).  Fischer (2006) makes a 
similar sort of argument.  He writes: “I have claimed that consideration of the examples 
of Jones (a typical Frankfurt-type case) should first elicit the intuition that the fact that 
there is a fail-safe device present that would intervene in the counterfactual scenario is 
irrelevant to the grounding of Jones’ moral responsibility.  My contention is that this then 
suggests that even if Jones had no alternative possibilities at all, this would be irrelevant 
to the grounding of his moral responsibility.  It would then follow that in a causally 
deterministic world, in which it is assumed that Jones has no alternative possibilities at 
all, his lack of alternative possibilities would be irrelevant to the grounding of his moral 
responsibility” (p. 198). 
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his alternative possibilities.  The counterfactual intervener, Black, can only eliminate 
Jones’ freedom to do otherwise if we assume that the relationship between Jones’ prior 
sign and his subsequent decision to lie is determined. 
To see that this is so, return to the original dilemma.  In order for Black to be able 
to eliminate Jones’ freedom to do otherwise, there must be a determined relationship 
between Jones’ prior twitch and his subsequent decision.  If the twitch is not 
deterministically related to his subsequent decision, then Black does not have an exact 
basis for prediction.  He will have to wait until after Jones has begun to decide one way 
or the other, to lie or not to lie, in order to know whether or not he needs to intervene.  
His waiting, however, ensures that, at the moment of choice, Jones could have done 
otherwise. 
So, for the counterfactual intervener to eliminate Jones’ freedom to do otherwise, 
there must be a determined relationship between Jones’ prior sign and his subsequent 
decision.  Since premise (1) of the argument is false, then the conclusion, (3), that it is 
plausible to think that determinism’s elimination of Jones’ freedom to do otherwise is 
irrelevant to the question of his blameworthiness, does not follow.  We have not, 
therefore, been given good reason to think that determinism’s elimination of Jones’ 
freedom to do otherwise is irrelevant to the question of his moral responsibility.  In fact, 
incompatibilists will insist that the way determinism eliminates Jones’ alternative 





                                                
2.5  Haji and McKenna’s response. 
 Haji and McKenna respond to my argument in their paper, ‘Defending Frankfurt’s 
argument in deterministic contexts: a reply to Palmer’ (2006).  They summarize my 
contention as to why premise (1) of their argument is false as follows: 
In a prior-sign Frankfurt case, the presence of the counterfactual intervener 
(Black), only in conjunction with an independently sufficient condition for Jones’ 
choosing to act as Black desires (the condition that Jones’ choice is causally 
determined), ensures that Jones has no alternatives (pp. 368-369).12 
They then sketch a line of reply to my criticism: 
What Palmer’s objection requires, really, is the stronger contention that it is not 
possible for there to be a case in which the counterfactual intervener eliminates 
alternatives without the assumption of determinism.  For if there were such a case, 
the claim that the counterfactual intervener qua counterfactual intervener is 
sufficient to rule out alternative possibilities would be vindicated.  And then 
surely we could just wed one of those cases to a deterministic context (p. 369). 
In other words, Haji and McKenna want to avoid my criticism by two steps of 
reasoning: 
Step one: Outline a Frankfurt case in which the counterfactual intervener 
eliminates the person’s freedom to do otherwise without needing to rely on a 
deterministic relationship between the individual’s prior sign and his subsequent 
decision. 
 
12 Here, and in what follows, I’ve altered the names of the individuals Haji and 
McKenna cite to fit with the presentation of my case.   
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Step two: Modify this case by making the relationship between the individual’s 
prior sign and his subsequent decision determined.  Such a modification – the 
‘adding’ of determinism – would not be required for the counterfactual intervener 
to have the power to eliminate the person’s freedom to do otherwise.  This is 
because if determinism were not true in the example, the counterfactual intervener 
would still have sufficient counterfactual power. 
Let us suppose for the sake of discussion that if this two-step strategy works, Haji 
and McKenna will have shown that premise (1), the claim that the counterfactual 
intervener and causal determinism are individually sufficient to eliminate Jones’ freedom 
to do otherwise, is true.  If they show this premise to be true, then they will be able to 
conclude that there are sound reasons to think that determinism’s elimination of Jones’ 
freedom to do otherwise would be irrelevant to assessing his blameworthiness.  
Moreover, if this were true, then incompatibilists could not legitimately complain that 
people would be duped into believing Frankfurt’s conclusion if they granted that Jones 
could be morally responsible for his decision prior to Black’s introduction into the 
example.  This is because even if incompatibilists are right to think that determinism 
would eliminate Jones’ alternative possibilities, they would be wrong to insist that this 
fact is relevant to an assessment of his blameworthiness. 
 The controversial part of Haji and McKenna’s reply is the first step, the claim that 
there can be Frankfurt cases in which the person’s prior sign is not deterministically 
related to his subsequent decision, yet the fail-safe mechanism eliminates all of the 
person’s robust alternative possibilities.  Two recent examples that have convinced many 
that such cases are possible have been developed by Mele and Robb (1998, 2003) and 
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Pereboom (2001, 2005).  (Haji and McKenna make use of Pereboom’s example to 
illustrate their contention that there can be such cases.)  In the final sections of the paper, 
I criticize these two new examples.  If I can undermine these cases, then I will have cast 
doubt on the soundness of Haji and McKenna’s first step in their reply to my criticism.   
The examples by Mele and Robb and by Pereboom are of considerable interest 
beyond whether or not Haji and McKenna can make use of them.  After all, if it could be 
demonstrated that it is possible for Black to eliminate Jones’ robust alternative 
possibilities without needing to rely on a deterministic relationship between Jones’ prior 
sign and his subsequent decision, then the issue of whether or not the deterministic 
relation begs the question against the incompatibilist would be moot.  Those wanting to 
reject PAP by using the Frankfurt cases would have successfully avoided the dilemma 
defense on the other horn of the dilemma, the indeterminism horn.  With this in mind, let 
me turn to assess the soundness of the indeterminism horn of the dilemma defense. 
 
2.6  The Indeterminism horn I: Pereboom. 
 According to the indeterminism horn of the dilemma defense, should the prior 
sign not be deterministically related to the individual’s subsequent decision, then the 
counterfactual intervener will be unable to eliminate all of the person’s robust alternative 
possibilities.  In what follows, I outline and criticize recent examples by Pereboom and 
Mele and Robb that attempt to avoid this criticism. 
 Here is Perboom’s (2005) considered presentation of his case, ‘Tax evasion,’ one 
he claims avoids the indeterminism horn of the dilemma: 
 30
Joe is considering whether to claim a tax deduction for the substantial local 
registration fee that he paid when he bought a house.  He knows that claiming the 
deduction is illegal, that he probably won’t be caught, and that if he is, he can 
convincingly plead ignorance.  Suppose he has a very powerful but not always 
overriding desire to advance his self-interest regardless of the cost to others, and 
no matter whether advancing his self-interest involves illegal activity.  Crucially, 
his psychology is such that the only way that in this situation he could fail to 
choose to evade taxes is for moral reasons.  His psychology is not, for example, 
such that he could fail to choose to evade taxes for no reason or simply on a 
whim.  In addition, it is causally necessary for his failing to choose to evade taxes 
in this situation that he attain a certain level of attentiveness to these moral 
reasons.  He can secure this level of attentiveness voluntarily.  However, his 
attaining this level of attentiveness is not causally sufficient for his failing to 
choose to evade taxes.  If he were to attain this level of attentiveness, Joe could, 
with his libertarian free will, either choose to evade taxes or refrain from so 
choosing (without the intervener’s device in place).  More generally, Joe is a 
libertarian free agent.  But to ensure that he chooses to evade taxes, a 
neuroscientist now implants a device, which, were it to sense the requisite level of 
attentiveness, would electronically stimulate his brain so that he would choose to 
evade taxes.  In actual fact, he does not attain this level of attentiveness, and he 
chooses to evade taxes while the device remains idle (pp. 231-232). 
Pereboom claims that the neuroscientist’s elimination of Joe’s alternative 
possibilities should not negate Joe’s moral responsibility for his decision because Joe 
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would have done the same thing for the same reasons even if the neuroscientist had not 
been present and he could have done otherwise.  Pereboom accepts the robustness 
principle as a restriction that PAP defenders should abide by in responding to Frankfurt 
cases.  He gives an account of robustness, arguing that an alternative possibility is robust, 
and so one that be legitimately cited as partly explaining why a person is morally 
responsible for his action, if and only if the individual “could have willed something 
other than what she actually willed such that she understood that by willing it she would 
thereby have been precluded from the moral responsibility she actually has for the 
action” (p. 230). 
Pereboom admits that Joe does have an alternative possibility open to him – the 
possibility to voluntarily achieve the level of attentiveness to moral reasons – but he 
argues that this is not a robust alternative, and so no help to the PAP defender.  He offers 
two reasons why this possibility is not robust.  First, Joe does not “believe that if he had 
achieved the requisite level of attentiveness he would thereby have been precluded from 
responsibility for deciding to evade taxes” (p. 232).  The reason for this is because his 
acquiring the requisite level of attentiveness is only a necessary, and not sufficient, 
condition for his deciding not to evade taxes (and he knows this fact).  It is still open to 
him, on achieving the requisite level of attentiveness, to decide to evade taxes.  Second, 
“Joe does not know enough to understand that voluntarily achieving the requisite 
attentiveness would preclude him from responsibility for choosing to evade taxes” (p. 
232).  Given that the neuroscientist’s involvement is unknown to Joe, “Joe doesn’t 
understand that the intervention would then take place [were he to achieve the requisite 
level of attentiveness], or that as a consequence of this intervention he would be 
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precluded from responsibility for choosing to evade taxes” (p. 233).  His ignorance of the 
neuroscientist’s involvements ensures that he could not know that by doing something 
else – i.e. by achieving the requisite attentiveness – he would (because of the 
neuroscientist’s subsequent intervention) be precluded from responsibility for choosing to 
evade taxes (because the neuroscientist would intervene and ‘make’ Joe make that 
choice). 
According to the dilemma that plagued Frankfurt’s original alleged 
counterexample to PAP, recall, if the target action is not deterministically related to the 
individual’s prior sign, then while not question-begging against the incompatibilist, the 
individual will have alternative possibilities open to him because the intervener will have 
to wait to see – that is, wait until the person has begun to act one way or the other – in 
order to know whether he must intervene.  Pereboom believes ‘Tax Evasion’ avoids this 
problem because, while Joe’s action is causally indetermined, he does not have open to 
him an alternative possibility that meets the robustness condition.  Joe knows that his 
voluntarily achieving the level of moral attentiveness is compatible with his still choosing 
to evade taxes (so it is not a robust alternative possibility to his evading taxes) and he also 
does not know that, by doing this, he would – because of the intervener’s intervention – 
have avoided responsibility for his action (thus failing to meet the condition for 
robustness that he should know that by willing the alternative action he would thereby – 
because of the intervener’s intervention – be precluded from the moral responsibility he 
actually has). 
In what follows, I argue that by paying closer attention to the details of his 
example, we see that Pereboom’s case fails to avoid the indeterminism horn of the 
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dilemma.  Specifically, I claim that by paying attention to the precise time at which Joe’s 
action is to be performed, we see that Joe does – contrary to Pereboom’s claim – have a 
robust alternative open to him on Pereboom’s definition of robustness, an alternative the 
neuroscientist does not have it within his power to eliminate.  Thus, ‘Tax Evasion’ does 
not constitute a counterexample to PAP. 
 
2.7  Criticizing Pereboom. 
Call the time at which Joe makes the decision to evade taxes t1, label the decision 
A, and call the requisite level of attentiveness to moral reasons (necessary but not 
sufficient for Joe to fail to decide A) B.  Suppose that Joe had made B occur at t1, rather 
than – as he actually did – decide A.  Now, we can agree with Pereboom that Joe’s 
making B occur is only a necessary and not sufficient condition for his failing to decide to 
evade taxes simpliciter.  However, his making B occur is sufficient for his failing to 
decide A at t1, because, at t1, Joe is making B occur instead. 
The neuroscientist’s device could not have intervened, and made Joe decide A, 
until some time t2 later than t1 (that is, some time t2 that begins later than t1).  This is 
because since Joe’s making B occur at t1 is indeterministic, it must be open up until t1 
that Joe could decide A at t1 rather than make B occur.  From this it follows that there 
exist no facts that entail that B occurs until a time after t1 has begun, because up until t1 
all the facts are consistent with Joe’s deciding A at t1 instead.  If Joe’s making B occur at 
t1 is indeterministic, then the facts entailing that B occurs at t1 only begin to obtain – they 
only come into being – when B’s occurring has begun to happen.  (On the other hand, if 
Joe’s making B occur at t1 were deterministically caused, then immediately before t1 
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begins there would exist facts entailing that B would occur at t1, namely, the fact that the 
deterministic cause has occurred and the fact that deterministic causal laws entail that 
such a cause produces B.) 
Necessarily, the intervening device could detect the occurrence of B only at a 
point when the facts entail that B occurs at t1.  Only then, at t2, once it becomes true (the 
facts entail that) B has begun to occur, could the device ‘know,’ so to speak, that (i) B has 
begun to occur, and so (ii) it should intervene and ‘make’ Joe decide A.13  The upshot is 
that Joe had a robust alternative possibility open to him at t1, the time he, in fact, decided 
A, to evade taxes.  The robust possibility is not that Joe had it open to him, at t1, to 
choose not to evade taxes simpliciter – the presence of the device ensures that, by t2, Joe 
will choose B.  Rather, he had it open to him, at t1, not to choose to evade taxes at t1. 
Ginet (2002) points out that, should the neuroscientist be unable to eliminate this 
alternative as I have argued, it would be robust according to Pereboom’s definition of 
robustness.  This is because should Joe have taken it, and made B occur at t1, he would 
then – before the device could ‘know’ that it must intervene (the device could not know 
this, as I have argued, until a later time t2) – know that by refraining from deciding A at 
that time, he would be avoiding responsibility for doing A at that time, t1.  He would 
know this simply in virtue of his not doing A right then – at that time, t1 – which he 
would, of course, be aware of.  (Recall that Pereboom contends that an alternative 
 
13  As Carl Ginet encouraged me to make clear, the point is not that Joe could begin to 
make B occur at t1 only after a short time after t1 has begun; Joe’s making B occur at t1 
is compatible with its being the case that his beginning to make B occur coincides with 
the beginning of t1.  Rather, the important point is that, even so, it becomes true that B 
has begun to occur – something of B has occurred – only at some instant t2 later than the 
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possibility is robust if and only if the agent could have willed something other than he did 
and he knew that by willing it he would have avoided the moral responsibility he, in fact, 
had for the action he, in fact, performed.) 
Summarizing the argument, the set up in ‘Tax Evasion’ is such that the 
counterfactual intervener cannot make it the case that the agent, Joe, could not have 
avoided acting in the way he did at the precise time he did so.  The alternative possibility 
open to him, at the time he acted, the possibility not to decide to evade taxes at t1, is – on 
Pereboom’s own definition – a robust alternative possibility. 
Pereboom (2005) offers a reply to Ginet’s point that the alternative possibility 
open to Joe is robust.  He begins by saying that  
Ginet’s contention depends on the claim that given that the mechanism would 
 have made Joe choose to evade taxes after t1, he would have been aware at t1 that 
 he was not making this choice, and he would have understood at t1 that by not 
 choosing to evade taxes right then, he would not have been responsible for 
 making this choice right then (p. 234).   
Then he amends his original example in the following way: 
In the neuroscientist’s setup, Joe’s making the necessary condition for doing 
otherwise [his making B occur at t1] instantaneously renders him unconscious for 
several minutes (p. 234). 
The device’s rendering Joe instantly unconscious, should he make B occur at t1 
rather than decide A, is supposed to ensure that, at t1, Joe does not have a robust 
 
beginning of t1.  And, necessarily, the intervening device could detect the occurrence of 
B only at a point when B has begun to occur. 
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alternative possibility open to him.  His being unconscious removes any open robust 
alternative possibility because – supposing he had made B occur at t1 – “at the next 
instant … Joe would not have been aware that he was not choosing to evade taxes, and he 
would not [at that instant]… have understood that by not choosing to evade taxes right 
then he would not have been responsible for choosing to evade taxes right then” (p. 234). 
We can suppose, for the sake of discussion, that Pereboom is right that, were Joe 
rendered instantaneously unconscious by the device should he have made B occur at t1, 
he would not have a robust alternative possibility open to him at t1.  However, the device 
cannot have the counterfactual power to render Joe unconscious at t1, were he to have 
made B occur at t1.  The device can only render Joe unconscious a short time, t2, that 
begins after t1 begins and because of this time gap, at t1, Joe will still have a robust 
alternative possibility open to him. 
The reason that the device cannot render Joe unconscious at t1 but only at t2 is the 
same reason that the device cannot intervene and ‘make’ Joe decide A at t1 should he 
make B occur then instead.  Since Joe’s making B occur at t1 is indeterministic, then the 
facts entailing that B occurs at t1 only begin to obtain – they only come into being – when 
B’s occurring has begun to happen, that is at a short time, t2, that begins later than t1.  
Only then, at t2, once it becomes true – the facts entail that – B has begun to occur, could 
the device ‘know,’ so to speak, that (i) B has begun to occur, and so (ii) it should 
intervene and render Joe unconscious.  Pereboom’s amended example fails to make it the 
case that Joe does not have a robust alternative possibility open to him because the 
intervener’s device cannot – contrary to Pereboom’s claim – have sufficient 
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counterfactual power to ensure that, should Joe have made B occur at t1, he would then – 
at t1 – be rendered unconscious. 
 I now turn to examine Mele and Robb’s Frankfurt case. 
 
2.8  The Indeterminism horn II: Mele and Robb. 
 Mele and Robb (1998) have offered another variant on Frankfurt’s original 
example that they claim avoids the horns of the dilemma defense.  Here is their case: 
Our scenario features an agent, Bob, who inhabits a world at which determinism 
is false …  At t1, Black initiates a certain deterministic process P in Bob’s brain 
with the intention of thereby causing Bob to decide at t2 (an hour later, say) to 
steal Ann’s car [call this decision E].  The process, which is screened off from 
Bob’s consciousness, will deterministically culminate in Bob’s deciding at t2 to 
steal Ann’s car unless he decides on his own at t2 to steal it or is incapable at t2 of 
making a decision (because, for example, he is dead by t2).  (Black is unaware 
that it is open to Bob to decide on his own at t2 to steal the car; he is confident 
that P will cause Bob to decide as he wants Bob to decide) …  As it happens, at t2 
Bob decides on his own to steal the car, on the basis of his own indeterministic 
deliberation about whether to steal it, and his deliberation has no deterministic 
cause [call this indeterministic deliberation process x].  But if he had not just then 
decided on his own to steal it, P would have deterministically issued, at t2, in his 
deciding to steal it.  Rest assured that P in no way influences the indeterministic 
decision-making process that actually issues in Bob’s decision (pp. 101-102). 
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What is unique in Mele and Robb’s example is that the intervention is not 
counterfactual, as it was in Frankfurt’s original case and in Pereboom’s example.  Rather, 
in Mele and Robb’s example, Black’s intervention is actual, something that occurs in the 
actual circumstances.  Specifically, Mele and Robb claim that Black’s initiation of a 
mechanism, P, inside Bob’s brain is such that it would deterministically cause Bob’s 
action at the precise time it actually occurs if Bob were not to perform it ‘on his own,’ via 
his indeterministic deliberative process, x.  In a forthcoming paper, ‘On Mele and Robb’s 
indeterministic Frankfurt-style case,’ Ginet and I argue that their example is 
unconvincing.  (The basic idea for this criticism is found in Ginet [2003]).  Let me 
explain our argument. 
 
2.9  Criticizing Mele and Robb. 
Vital to Mele and Robb’s example is the idea that Bob’s indeterministic process x 
blocks or preempts the deterministic process P from causing E at t2.  With this in mind, 
we can ask what fact is it about x that is supposed to explain how x blocks or preempts P 
from causing E?  In a later article, Mele and Robb (2003: 137, footnote 11) claim that it is 
x’s causing E at t2 that blocks/preempts P from causing E at t2.  However, if what 
allegedly makes it the case that x blocks P from causing E at t2 is x’s causing E at t2, 
then Mele and Robb’s example is in trouble.  This is because, in the counterfactual 
scenario in which P but not x causes E, P can only cause E at an instant t3 later than t2.  
So, if it is x’s causing E at t2 that blocks/preempts P from causing E at t2, then it cannot 
be the case that, if x had not caused E, then P would have caused E at precisely the same 
time.  But then Mele and Robb’s case cannot be a counterexample to PAP.  For a 
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counterexample to work, it needs to be the case that at the precise time t2 when he 
decided to steal the car, Bob could not have then done other than decide to steal it.  That 
is, it needs to be the case that if x had not indeterministically caused that decision then, P 
would have caused it precisely then.  But in Mele and Robb’s example, this is not the 
case. 
Why, in the counterfactual scenario, can’t P cause E at t2 rather than only at a 
later instant, t3?  Borrowing from the same general line of reasoning that undermined 
Pereboom’s example, the fact that P can only cause E at t3, rather than at t2, follows from 
the fact that since x’s causing E is not deterministically caused, it must be open up until t2 
that x causes something else or nothing at all at t2.  From this it follows that there are no 
facts entailing that x causes E until an instant after t2, because up until that instant the 
facts are consistent with x’s causing something else or nothing at all at t2.  (On the other 
hand, if E at t2 were deterministically caused, then immediately before t2 there would be 
facts entailing that E would be caused to occur at t2, namely, the fact that the 
deterministic cause has occurred and the fact that deterministic causal laws entail that 
such a cause directly produces E.) 
This criticism is similar, of course, to the original dilemma defense made in 
response to Frankfurt’s original example.  According to the dilemma, unless the sign 
Jones displays prior to his decision is deterministically related to his subsequent decision, 
then Black will not have an exact basis for knowing what Jones will do.  He will have to 
wait until after Jones has begun to decide one way or the other to know whether or not he 
needs to intervene.  Black must wait because Jones’ twitching (in the original example) is 
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not deterministically related to his decision.  His waiting, however, ensures that Jones 
could not have done otherwise. 
Making the operation of the fail-safe mechanism actual and not merely 
counterfactual (as Mele and Robb do) does not remove the fundamental problem here.  
Just as Black has to wait until Bob begins to decide to judge whether to intervene, the 
process P has to wait to see whether the indeterministic process x does cause E – i.e., has 


















Chapter Three: Raising the Responsibility Question 
 
 In the previous chapter, I argued that the Frankfurt cases do not show PAP to be 
false because they fall prey to a dilemma, both horns of which undermine their cogency.  
Defending or rejecting the soundness of this dilemma has been the main point of 
controversy between those what want to use Frankfurt’s example to reject PAP and those 
who want to show that his cases do not threaten the principle.  However, recently, PAP-
defenders have developed a different line of response to the examples.  They have begun 
to question the very claim that Jones, the individual in the Frankfurt case, should be 
thought to act freely and responsibly in the first place.  As I shall put it, PAP-adherent’s 
have raised the responsibility question with respect to the cases by challenging the, until 
now, taken-for-granted claim that when Jones acts in Frankfurt-style circumstances, he 
does so freely and responsibly.  In what follows, I want to evaluate this line of response. 
  
3.1  Raising the responsibility question. 
  Raising the responsibility question is significant because of the following kind of 
dialectical situation, aptly described in a recent paper by Michael McKenna (2008a): 
A simplistic interpretation of Frankfurt’s argument is that it begins and ends with 
just that, the production of an example thought to have an intuitively compelling 
result and in conflict with a principle of moral reasoning [namely, PAP].  But if 
this were all there were to Frankfurt’s argument, why should it be so clear that … 
[the example] should trump the principle?  Why not react to the example by 
saying that, as jarring as it seems, and despite our strong inclination to hold Jones 
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blameworthy, the proper judgment is that he is not.  For, as the objection might 
go, it turns out Jones could not do otherwise in acting as he did, and since PAP is 
such a powerful principle within the arsenal of our moral reasoning, in adhering to 
PAP, we must resist our intuition regarding the example (p. 772). 
McKenna’s remarks bring to light the following question: why should we think 
that Jones is blameworthy for his behavior, given the plausibility of PAP?  Indeed, 
perhaps the correct response is that Jones is not blameworthy for lying precisely because 
he could not have done otherwise. 
 
3.2  The Irrelevance principle. 
Rather than appeal to brute intuition in response to this challenge, Frankfurt and 
his defenders might appeal to some fact about the case, attention to which might invite 
the thought that, despite PAP’s intuitive plausibility, the proper judgment is nonetheless 
that Jones is morally responsible.  We might ask ourselves, on reflection, what is it about 
Jones’ situation that invites the thought that he is blameworthy for lying despite the fact 
that he could not have done otherwise?  Frankfurt (1969) suggests an answer to this 
question in the following passage from his original paper: 
… it would have made no difference, so far as concerns … [Jones’] action or how 
he came to perform it, if the circumstances that made it impossible for him to 
avoid performing it had not prevailed.  The fact that he could not have done 
otherwise clearly provides no basis for supposing that he might have done 
otherwise if he had been able to do so.  When a fact is in this way irrelevant to the 
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problem of accounting for the person’s action it seems quite gratuitous to assign it 
any weight in the assessment of his moral responsibility (p. 837). 
Frankfurt makes it clear in this passage that what he means by saying that the fact 
that Jones could not have done otherwise is ‘irrelevant to the problem of accounting for 
the person’s action’ is that this fact had nothing to do with the “circumstances actually 
moving him or leading him to do it” (p. 830).  The fact that he could not have done 
otherwise did not “figure at all among the circumstances that actually brought it about 
that he did what he did” (pp. 836-837).  These remarks thus suggest that Frankfurt has in 
mind something like the following principle: 
The Irrelevance Principle (IP): 
If a fact is irrelevant to a correct account of the causal explanation of the person’s 
action, then it would be gratuitous to assign it any weight in the assessment of his 
moral responsibility for his action. 
IP can be used to form an argument, on Frankfurt’s behalf, that despite the fact 
that Jones cannot do otherwise, the proper judgment is that he is blameworthy for his 
decision to lie.  Call it 
 The Irrelevance Argument: 
 (1) If a fact is irrelevant to a correct account of the causal explanation of the 
person’s action, then it would be gratuitous to assign it any weight in the 
assessment of his moral responsibility (the irrelevance principle). 
(2) The fact that Jones could not have done otherwise is irrelevant to a correct 
account of the causal explanation of Jones’ action. 
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(3) Therefore, it would be gratuitous to assign it any weight in the assessment of 
his moral responsibility. 
(4) Besides the fact that he could not have done otherwise, there are no other facts 
that could even prima facie count against Jones’ being blameworthy for lying. 
(5) Therefore, Jones is blameworthy for lying despite lacking the freedom to do 
otherwise, and so PAP is false. 
 The controversial part of this argument, I believe, is premise (1), the irrelevance 
principle.  Is it true that if a fact is irrelevant to a correct account of the causal 
explanation of a person’s action, then it would be gratuitous to assign it any weight in the 
assessment of his moral responsibility?   
 
3.3  Challenging the irrelevance argument. 
David Widerker (2000, 2006) has argued – correctly, to my mind – that the 
irrelevance principle is false.  He claims that “there are intuitive examples that show that 
sometimes the reason we absolve an agent from blame (or hold him to be blameworthy) 
for performing a certain act, does not figure at all in the causal explanation of the act” 
(2006: 178).  For the most promising of his counterexamples to IP, consider the 
following.  In the Frankfurt case, Jones decides to lie to save embarrassing himself, 
despite knowing that it is morally wrong for him to do this.  He does not decide to lie for 
the reason that it is morally wrong; he makes the decision in spite of knowing this, 
deciding to lie purely to save public embarrassment.  In other words, since Jones decides 
to lie to avoid embarrassment, we can say that he would have made the same decision 
whether or not he believed his decision to be immoral.   
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The fact that Jones knows his decision to lie is morally wrong is irrelevant to a 
correct account of the causal explanation of his decision and so, according to IP, it would 
be gratuitous to assign it any weight in the assessment of his moral responsibility.  But 
surely the fact that Jones knows it would be morally wrong to lie yet decides to lie 
anyway does bear on his blameworthiness.  A person is more blameworthy, it would 
seem, if he knows his action is morally wrong and acts anyway in spite of knowing this, 
than if he does not know it to be morally wrong. 
In response to cases like this, Frankfurt (2003) has recently agreed that it would 
not be gratuitous to assign the fact that Jones knew his action to be morally wrong some 
weight in the assessment of his blameworthiness.  However, he argues that this does not 
undermine his argument against PAP because “it is considerably less obvious that … this 
fact plays no role in explaining why … [Jones] acted as he did” (p. 342).  Frankfurt 
argues as follows: 
… to explain an act fully, it is not enough to report merely that he acted for selfish 
reasons.  What counts in the assessment of a person’s moral responsibility is not 
only what causes, reasons, or motives led to his action.  It is also important to 
appreciate what sort of act he thought he was forming.  A morally pertinent 
explanation of what a person has done must include an account of what he 
believed himself to be doing (pp. 342-343). 
With these remarks, Frankfurt agrees that Jones’ belief that his decision was 
immoral is not part of the causal explanation of what he did.  However, he suggests that 
Jones’s belief is nonetheless part of a ‘morally pertinent explanation’ of his behavior.  
Furthermore, it is when a fact is irrelevant to this kind of explanation – a morally 
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pertinent one – and not simply irrelevant to the causal explanation of the action that it 
would be gratuitous to assign the fact some weight in the assessment of the person’s 
moral responsibility. 
 
3.4  The Revised irrelevance principle. 
 Frankfurt’s remarks thus suggest that he would endorse a revised irrelevance 
principle: 
The Revised Irrelevance Principle (RIP): 
If a fact is irrelevant to a correct account of a morally pertinent explanation of a 
person’s action, then it would be gratuitous to assign it any weight in the 
assessment of his moral responsibility for his action. 
This revised principle can also be used on Frankfurt’s behalf to construct an 
argument against the truth of PAP along similar lines to that originating from the original 
irrelevance principle.  Call this new argument 
 The Revised Irrelevance Argument: 
 (1’) If a fact is irrelevant to a correct account of a morally pertinent explanation 
of the person’s action, then it would be gratuitous to assign it any weight in the 
assessment of his moral responsibility (the revised irrelevance principle). 
(2’) The fact that Jones could not have done otherwise is irrelevant to a correct 
account of a morally pertinent explanation of Jones’ action. 
(3’) Therefore, it would be gratuitous to assign it any weight in the assessment of 
his moral responsibility. 
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(4’) Besides the fact that he could not have done otherwise, there are no other 
facts that could even prima facie count against Jones’ being blameworthy for 
lying. 
(5’) Therefore, Jones is blameworthy for lying despite lacking the freedom to do 
otherwise, and so PAP is false. 
Mirroring the line of reasoning from the original irrelevance argument, absent the 
presence of any other prima facie reason that could count against his blameworthiness, 
the proper judgment following from this argument is that Jones is blameworthy for 
deciding to lie despite lacking the freedom to do otherwise.  Hence, PAP is false. 
 
3.5  Challenging the revised irrelevance argument. 
I would argue that this revised irrelevance argument is not successful because it is 
question-begging.  The problem is with premise (2’): The fact that Jones could not have 
done otherwise is irrelevant to a correct account of a morally pertinent explanation of 
Jones’ action. 
What is a ‘morally pertinent explanation’?  On the most natural reading, a morally 
pertinent explanation of Jones’ action would be an explanation that is pertinent to his 
moral responsibility.  However, given this, the argument begs the question against the 
PAP-adherent.  For the only way in which it could be true that the fact that Jones could 
not have done otherwise is irrelevant to a morally pertinent explanation of his action is by 
assuming that the fact that Jones could not have done otherwise is irrelevant to an 
explanation of Jones’ moral responsibility.  But making this assumption as part of an 
argument whose conclusion is that PAP is false is question-begging. 
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3.6  The W-defense. 
In response to this question-begging charge, Frankfurt and his defenders might 
turn the tables and ask why we should think that PAP is so intuitive in the first place.  In 
asking this question, the PAP-rejecters are asking for a justification of PAP itself. 
David Widerker (2000, 2005) suggests one line of response to this question, 
arguing that the reason Jones should be thought blameless for his decision is that his 
inability to do otherwise ensures that there is no good answer to the question ‘What 
should Jones have done instead?’  Unless there is a good answer to this question, 
according to Widerker, then Jones cannot be blameworthy for his behavior.  
Widerker calls this line of argument the ‘W-defense,’ short for the ‘what-should-
he-have-done defense’.  He writes: 
… since you, Frankfurt, wish to hold him [Jones] blameworthy for his decision … 
tell me what, in your opinion, should he have done instead?  Now you cannot 
claim that he should not have decided [as he did] … since this was something that 
it was not in Jones’ power not to do.  Hence, I do not see how you can hold Jones 
blameworthy for his decision (2000: 191). 
Since Jones could not have done otherwise, anyone wanting to hold Jones 
responsible for his decision cannot provide a satisfactory answer to the question ‘What 
should he have done instead?’  They must say either that what he should have done was 
not to have decided as he did (and hence have decided not to lie) or that there was 
nothing that he should have done instead.  However, these replies are not good answers to 
the question.  The point can be put in terms of fairness.  After all, how can it be fair to 
blame a person for an action if what he should have done instead (i.e., not to act as he 
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did) is something that it was not within his power to do?  Similarly, how can it be fair to 
blame a person for an action if there is nothing else he should have done instead?  If there 
is no satisfactory answer to what Jones should have done instead, then it seems unfair to 
think that he is blameworthy for his decision. 
Of course, if Jones could have done otherwise, then it is plausible to think that a 
satisfactory answer to what he should have done instead can be provided.  When asking, 
in these circumstances, what Jones should have done instead, it is reasonable to reply that 
he should not have decided as he did – he should have decided not to lie.  Since this was 
something that it was within his power to do, this answer is legitimate and so no 
obstruction to his blameworthiness. 
Is Widerker’s W-defense a good way of defending PAP in the face of the 
Frankfurt cases?  Two philosophers in particular, John Martin Fischer (2006) and 
McKenna (2005a, 2008a), have raised objections to Widerker’s argument.  In the 
remainder of the chapter, I want to defend Widerker’s view against these criticisms. 
 
3.7  Responding to the W-defense: Fischer. 
 Fischer (2006) criticizes Widerker’s argument on the grounds that it requires the 
truth of the maxim ‘ought-implies-can,’ a maxim he claims is false.  However, Widerker 
(2005) argues that the W-defense, when properly understood, does not rely on this maxim 
at all.  Widerker’s argument here turns on the claim that when asking what Jones should 
have done, there are two things that might be being asked: what Jones ought to have 
done, on the one hand, and what it would be morally reasonable to have expected him to 
do, on the other.  If what is being asked is what Jones ought to have done instead, then 
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the reply that it is unfair to blame him if what he ought to have done was not something 
that it was within his power to do would seem to require that ought implies can.  
However, Widerker insists that in asking what Jones should have done, he means to ask 
what it would be morally reasonable to expect him to have done.  With this in mind, it 
would not require ought implies can to claim that it is unfair to blame Jones if what it 
would be morally reasonable to expect him to have done was not something that he was 
free to do. 
 The idea is that asking what a person morally ought to do is to describe his moral 
obligations.  Yet, it may not be morally reasonable to expect the person to fulfill his 
obligations if this would require him to do the impossible and perform an action that he 
was not free to perform.  To illustrate this point, grant that Jones had a moral obligation 
not to lie – this is what he ought to have done.  The issue raised by the W-defense is 
whether or not it would be morally reasonable to have expected him to meet this 
obligation.  Widerker argues that it would not be morally reasonable to have expected 
Jones to meet this obligation since this would be to expect him to have done the 
impossible and do something (i.e., not lie) that he was not free to do.  
 The issue of the relationship between the W-defense and ‘ought-implies-can’ is 
subtle.  Moreover, many philosophers are inclined to think that the maxim is true.  For 
these reasons, others have sought to reject Widerker’s arguments in ways that do not rely 





                                                
3.8  Responding to the W-defense: McKenna. 
 Once such philosopher is McKenna (2005a) who argues that the best strategy 
open to the defender of Frankfurt’s argument is to: 
… counter Widerker’s question with an invitation to consider what the agent has 
done.  To Widerker’s question, ‘What would you have had Jones do?’ Frankfurt 
can reply, ‘Look at what Jones has done.’ Frankfurt’s better answer, I believe, is 
to admit just for argument’s sake that he has no good answer to what he would 
have had Jones do, but against this intuitively disturbing result, Frankfurt can call 
attention to what Jones has actually done.  The ballgame then comes down to a 
battle of intuitions (p. 177). 
More recently, McKenna (2008a) has called this the ‘L-reply,’ short for the ‘look-
what-he-has-done defense’.14  Its goal is to shift attention away from considerations of 
what alternatives Jones may or may not have had open to him, and towards the issue of 
what Jones actually did.  As McKenna acknowledges: 
our conception of the standards of blame and holding responsible is tied deeply to 
a conception of the possible alternatives a morally responsible agent disregards in 
favor of her settled course of action.  Widerker’s W-defense forces us to 
acknowledge that some of our intuitions about alternative possibilities will be 
resistant to Frankfurt’s diagnosis (2005: 177).   
However, McKenna argues that his L-reply helps to marshal a different set of 
compelling intuition about responsibility by inviting us “to fix upon the moral quality of 
 
14 Pereboom (Fischer, Kane, Pereboom, & Vargas, 2007), a prominent PAP-rejecter, 
endorses McKenna’s strategy as the best line of reply to the W-defense. 
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the agent’s conduct, to consider what sort of estimation we ought to attach to it” (2008a: 
785). 
 McKenna’s reply is interesting, but is it successful?  One way to understand the 
W-defense is as follows: 
(1) Someone claiming that Jones deserves blame for lying can be asked ‘what 
should Jones have done instead?’ 
(2) Unless there is a good answer to this question, then Jones cannot be thought to 
deserve blame for lying. 
(3) There is no good answer to this question in Jones’ case. 
(4) Therefore, Jones does not deserve blame for lying. 
This argument is valid.  The question is whether or not it is sound.  McKenna 
thinks that it is unsound.  But it is unclear which premise he wants to attack.  From the 
first part of his remarks, he appears to reject premise (3).  He suggests that “to Widerker’s 
question, ‘What would you have had Jones do?’ Frankfurt can reply, ‘Look at what Jones 
has done’” (2005a: 177).  One way of interpreting McKenna here is this: he is saying 
that, contrary to (3), there is a satisfactory answer to Widerker’s question in Jones’ case, 
namely the answer ‘Look at what Jones has done’.  And since there is a proper answer to 
what Jones should have done instead, then this is no obstacle to his being blameworthy.  
But such a response is unpersuasive.  For saying, ‘Look what Jones has done,’ is not a 
bona fide reply to the question, ‘What should Jones have done instead?’  The point is not 
that the reply is unconvincing.  Rather, it is that the remark is not even a candidate reply 
to that question at all. 
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McKenna’s remark is more plausibly construed not as a bona fide reply to 
Widerker’s question, but as a comment made in the light of it.  In particular, it is a 
comment designed to direct intuitions away from those favoring PAP (found in the W-
defense) and towards those that center upon what Jones actually did and the moral quality 
of the will with which he acted.  But, if this is how McKenna’s argument is to be 
interpreted, then it is unclear whether he has engaged with Widerker’s argument.  After 
suggesting that Frankfurt can reply ‘Look at what Jones has done’ to Widerker’s 
question, McKenna changes direction by writing that the Frankfurt defender “should 
admit just for argument’s sake that he has no good answer to what he would have had 
Jones do, but against this intuitively disturbing result, Frankfurt can call attention to what 
Jones has actually done” (p. 177). 
McKenna here seems to be agreeing with premise (3), that there is no satisfactory 
answer to this question in Jones’ case.  Which premise then is he challenging?  The best 
interpretation seems to be that he is questioning the truth of premise (2), the claim that 
unless there is a satisfactory answer to Widerker’s question, then Jones cannot be 
regarded as blameworthy.  On this reading, McKenna is claiming that (2) is false: even if 
there is no good answer to the question of what Jones should have done instead, so long 
as he made his decision ‘on his own,’ without Black’s intervention, then he can deserve 
blame for lying. 
 But in the light of this claim, the PAP-defender can once again press the 
responsibility question, and why it should be thought right to think Jones blameworthy for 
a decision to lie he made ‘on his own,’ given that he could not have done otherwise?  The 
answer given by Frankfurt, McKenna, and others would presumably rest on the some 
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version of the irrelevance principle, that since Jones’ inability to do otherwise is 
irrelevant to (say) a correct account of the causal explanation of his decision, then it 
would be gratuitous to assign it any weight in assessing his blameworthiness.  However, 
this principle is false and McKenna’s reply to the W-defense cannot succeed by resting 
on it.  So, whether McKenna’s L-reply is understood as claiming, on the one hand, that 
there is a good answer to the question of what Jones should have done or, on the other 
hand, as challenging the claim that unless there is a proper answer to this question, then 

















Chapter Four: Frankfurt’s Indirect Attack on PAP – The Hierarchical Account 
 
 In chapters two and three, I argued that direct attacks on the truth of PAP by way 
of the Frankfurt cases are unconvincing.  Despite the arguments of Frankfurt, Fischer, 
McKenna, Mele, Pereboom, and others, when we look closely at the details of these 
apparent counterexamples, we see that they do not provide a good reason to abandon the 
association of moral responsibility with the freedom to do otherwise.  In the last four 
chapters of the dissertation, I want to evaluate the soundness of a different threat to PAP.  
Aside from direct attacks, the principle has been challenged indirectly by compatibilists 
who argue that there are alternative, compatibilist conceptions of freedom that are 
different from the freedom to do otherwise.  These, so called, new compatibilists argue 
that these alternative conceptions of freedom do not rely on alternative possibilities yet 
are sufficient to capture the freedom required for moral responsibility.  If they are 
correct, then PAP would be false.  For the freedom pertinent for moral responsibility 
could then be captured without needing to make use of the freedom to do otherwise. 
 In his 1971 paper, ‘Freedom of the will and the concept of a person,’ Frankfurt 
offered one of the earliest and most influential modern conceptions of freedom not reliant 
on alternative possibilities.  He argued that the freedom required for moral responsibility 
could be captured without reference to the freedom to do otherwise by focusing solely on 
the hierarchical structure of a person’s desires.  In this chapter, I outline and motivate 
Frankfurt’s argument, offering a new interpretation of his positive view of the freedom 
required for moral responsibility.  In chapter five, I criticize Frankfurt’s argument 
claiming that it is subject to regress difficulties that undermine its cogency, and so is no 
 56
threat to PAP.  In the final chapters of the dissertation, I outline, evaluate, and defend 
arguments that there are principled reasons to think that any account of the freedom 
required for moral responsibility not reliant on alternative possibilities will fail to capture 
the freedom required for morally responsible agency. 
 
4.1  Three freedoms. 
 During the course of his paper, Frankfurt (1971) distinguishes between three 
different kinds of freedom: (i) freedom of action, or one’s action being free, (ii) freedom 
of the will, or one’s will being free, and (iii) acting freely and of one’s own free will.  In 
this section, I outline how Frankfurt describes these different freedoms and how he views 
their relationship to the issue of a person’s moral responsibility. 
 Frankfurt initially distinguishes between a person’s first-order desires (whose 
objects are actions), second-order desires (who objects are first-order desires), and his 
second-order volitions (which are desires that particular first-order desires should move 
him to act).  With respect to the distinction between first-order and second-order desires, 
an individual’s first-order desire is a desire to act – a desire to watch television, eat 
chocolate, or sleep, for instance.  By contrast, a person’s second-order desire is a desire 
for a desire – a desire to want to study more, or a desire to desire to exercise, for example. 
 A second-order volition is a type of second-order desire.  It is a desire for a desire 
to move one to action.  For instance, suppose a person is conflicted at the most immediate 
level about what he wants to do.  He finds himself desiring to study but also wanting to 
watch television.  However, he remembers that he has an exam the following day that 
helps him resolve his dilemma about what to do.  Being of a studious disposition, and 
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valuing high-grades over the short-term pleasure of relaxation, he forms a desire that his 
desire to study, rather than his desire to watch television, should move him to act.  
 To further illustrate the difference between a second-order desire and a second-
order volition, Frankfurt gives the example of a doctor who, in wanting to understand the 
symptoms of his patients but not wanting to become addicted, desires to have the first-
order desire for the drug so he can experience the cravings, but does not desire to be 
moved by that desire because he does not actually want to take the drug (p. 9). 
 I want to make two other points before I outline the three kinds of freedom 
Frankfurt describes.  First, Frankfurt calls a person’s motivating first-order desire – the 
desire that moves him to act when he acts, or the desire that would move him to act were 
he to act – his will or his effective desire.  Second, Frankfurt contrasts a person with, what 
he calls, a wanton, claiming that it is the possession of second-order desires – and 
second-order volitions, in particular – that is “essential” (p. 10) to personhood.15  By 
contrast, a wanton is a being who “does not care about his will” (p. 11), for although he 
has first-order desires, he has no preferences about which of these desires he would like 
to move him to act.  Because he lacks second-order volitions, a wanton is not a person.  
(Frankfurt allows that a wanton may have second-order desires that are not volitions.) 
 When it comes to his account of freedom, Frankfurt’s foils are the classical 
compatibilist accounts of freedom and responsibility popular during the first half of the 
twentieth century (e.g., Ayer, 1954; Moore, 1912).  According to these views, freedom is 
 
15 At one point in his essay, Frankfurt says that it is an individual’s “having” (p. 10) 
second-order volitions that is essential to his being a person, whereas in earlier parts of 
the paper he claims that it is merely the “capacity” (p. 7), or the individual’s being “able” 
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a matter of doing what one wants to do and being free to do otherwise in the sense that 
one would have done otherwise, if one had wanted to.  Frankfurt argues that the problem 
with these accounts is that while they might capture the idea of a person having freedom 
of action, they “miss … entirely … the peculiar content of the quite different idea of an 
agent whose will is free” (p. 14).  With this as background, Frankfurt distinguishes 
freedom of action from freedom of the will as follows: 
… freedom of action is (roughly, at least) the freedom to do what one wants to do.  
Analogously, then, the statement that a person enjoys freedom of the will means 
(also roughly) that he is free to want what he wants to want.  More precisely, it 
means that he is free to will what he wants to will, or to have the will he wants.  
Just as the question about the freedom of an agent’s action has to do with whether 
it is the action he wants to perform, so the question about the freedom of his will 
has to do with whether it is the will he wants to have (p. 15). 
These remarks raise the question of what Frankfurt means by speaking of an 
individual as being free to so-and-so, in these senses.  After all, with respect to freedom 
of action, “there is a sense,” as John Martin Fischer (1986) points out, “of ‘having the 
power to do what one wants’ on which one would have this power insofar as one had the 
power to do what one actually wants (but nothing else)” (p. 44, footnote 28).  Similarly, 
with respect to freedom of the will, there is a sense in which if an individual wills what 
he wants to will then he must have been free to do so, even if he could not have willed 
otherwise. 
 
(p. 6), to form second-order volitions that is required for personhood.  I set this ambiguity 
aside. 
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Does Frankfurt mean by freedom of action and freedom of the will only a ‘one-
way’ power that does not rely on alternative possibilities or considerations as to what the 
individual could have done?  I do not think so.  Later in his essay, Frankfurt claims that 
for an individual’s will to be free – or for him to have freedom of the will, a term 
Frankfurt treats as synonymous – it must be true that “with regard to any of his first-order 
desires, he is free either to make that desire his will or to make some other desire his will 
instead.  Whatever his will, then, the will of a person who is free could have done 
otherwise; he could have done otherwise than to constitute his will as he did” (pp. 18-19).  
Freedom of the will, then, requires in some sense the freedom to will otherwise.  And, 
since Frankfurt claims that freedom of the will and freedom of action should be treated 
analogously, I take it that he thinks of a correct analysis of freedom of action as involving 
a freedom to do otherwise – in this case, a freedom to act otherwise. 
Frankfurt argues that an individual fails to have freedom of action when he is “not 
free to translate his desires into actions or act according to the determinations of his will” 
(p. 15).  Presumably he has in mind situations in which a person is motivated to do 
something – to take an elevator, for instance – yet is prevented from acting, from 
‘translating his will into action,’ by, say, being physically restrained by another person.  
We can identify the individual’s will or motivating desire in this case because it is his 
desire to take the elevator that would move him to act, were he able to act (recall 
Frankfurt’s definition of a person’s will as not merely the first-order desire that moves 
him to act, but also the desire that would move him to act when or if he acts). 
Finally, on the difference between freedom of action and freedom of the will, 
Frankfurt argues that freedom of action is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for 
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freedom of the will (pp. 14-15).  A person can have freedom of the will without 
possessing freedom of action because he might be free to have the motivating desires he 
wants to have while being unable to act from that motivating desire.  As Frankfurt would 
put it, he might be unable to translate his will, the desire that motivates him, into action.  
A person locked up in chains would be a good example of someone who lacks freedom of 
action but may well have freedom of the will.  After all, while the chains prevent the 
prisoner in a straightforward sense from being free to act as he desires, he would 
presumably be free to will whatever he wants to will.  His problem is that, being locked 
up, he is not free to translate his will into actual behavior. 
As for freedom of action not being sufficient for freedom of the will, I give two 
examples.  First, plausibly, a wanton has freedom of action but not freedom of the will 
because while it may be true that he is free to act as he desires, the fact that he does not 
have second-order volitions means that he is not free to be motivated by desires that he 
wants to be motivated by.  The wanton lacks freedom of the will “by default” (p. 15), as 
Frankfurt puts it.  Second, Frankfurt gives an example of an unwilling drug addict, an 
addict who does not want to be an addict and struggles (unsuccessfully) against his 
addiction.  The addict forms a second-order volition towards his desire not to take the 
drug, but it is his addictive desire to take the drug that moves him to action.  I think that 
the unwilling addict has freedom of action but not freedom of the will.  He possesses 
freedom of action because he is free to act as he desires and, plausibly, he is free to do 
otherwise in the sense that had some other desire motivated him, he would have acted 
from that desire.  But, he lacks freedom of the will because the irresistibility of his desire 
for the drug ensures that, in a straightforward sense, he is not free to will what he wants 
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to will.  The unwilling addict wants his desire not to take the drug to be the desire that 
motivates him but he is unable to form his will accordingly – he is unable to ‘make’ this 
desire his will, so to speak – because of the strength of his desire for the drug.  The 
difference between the person locked in chains (who possesses freedom of the will) and 
the unwilling addict (who does not) is that the prisoner is free to have the will he wants to 
have in a way in which the unwilling addict is not. 
Having discussed the distinction Frankfurt makes between freedom of action and 
freedom of the will, I turn to the third kind of freedom Frankfurt describes, the freedom 
to act freely and of one’s own free will.  Unlike the other two freedoms, this freedom 
does not require that the person could have done otherwise.  Frankfurt introduces this 
third freedom by reference to the previous two: 
It is a mistake, however, to believe that someone acts freely only when he is free 
to do whatever he wants or that he acts of his own free will only if his will is free.  
Suppose that a person has done what he wanted to do, that he did it because he 
wanted to do it, and that the will by which he was moved when he did it was his 
will because it was the will he wanted.  Then he did it freely and of his own free 
will (p. 19). 
So, for Frankfurt, a person acts freely and of his own free will if and only if the 
first-order desire from which he acts is his will because it was the will he wanted.16  
Frankfurt then argues that this kind of freedom is all the freedom required for a person to 
be morally responsible for his behavior.  Moral responsibility requires neither freedom of 
 
16 Strictly speaking, the quotation only specifies that meeting these conditions is 
sufficient for acting freely and of one’s own free will.  I set this complication aside. 
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action (and so not the freedom to act otherwise) nor freedom of the will (and so not the 
freedom to will otherwise).  All it requires is that an individual acts from a desire that is 
his will because it was the will he wanted.  Describing a person who acts with this kind of 
freedom, Frankfurt writes: 
Even supposing that he could have done otherwise, he would not have done 
otherwise; and even supposing that he could have had a different will, he would 
not have wanted his will to differ from what it was.  Moreover, since the will that 
moved him when he acted was his will because he wanted it to be, he cannot 
claim that his will was forced upon him or that he was a passive bystander to its 
constitution.  Under these conditions, it is quite irrelevant to the evaluation of his 
moral responsibility to inquire whether the alternatives that he opted against were 
actually available to him (p. 19). 
This condition on the freedom needed for moral responsibility comprises 
Frankfurt’s indirect attack on PAP.  In his earlier paper, Frankfurt (1969) argued directly 
that PAP is false by way of an apparent counterexample known as a Frankfurt case.  His 
route to the claim that PAP is false is different here.  In this later paper, Frankfurt is 
attempting to undermine the truth of PAP indirectly by describing a kind of freedom that 
does not rely on alternative possibilities but is sufficient, in his view, to capture the 
freedom required for moral responsibility.  If it is true that a person acts with the freedom 
required for moral responsibility if he is motivated by a desire that is his will because it 
was the will he wanted, then PAP would be false.  This is because a person can act with 
this kind of freedom without needing to be able to do otherwise in any sense. 
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4.2  Frankfurt as a compatibilist. 
Frankfurt is usually identified as a compatibilist about free will and moral 
responsibility on the one hand and the truth of causal determinism on the other.  In his 
first remarks about this in his 1971 paper, Frankfurt writes: 
My conception of freedom of the will appears to be neutral with regard to the 
problem of determinism.  It seems conceivable that it should be causally 
determined that a person is free to want what he wants to want.  If this is 
conceivable, then it might be causally determined that a person enjoys a free will 
(p. 20). 
What is the relationship concerning the compatibility between each of Frankfurt’s 
three conceptions of freedom – freedom of action, freedom of the will, and acting freely 
and of one’s own free will – and the truth of determinism?  I see how on Frankfurt’s view 
it could be causally determined that a person ‘acts freely and of his own free will’ and so 
causally determined that a person acts with the freedom required for moral responsibility.  
This is because I see how it could be causally determined that the desire that motivates a 
person was his will because it was the will he wanted.  So far as his account of the 
freedom required for moral responsibility is concerned, Frankfurt is a compatibilist. 
However, the relationship between his other two freedoms – freedom of action 
and freedom of the will – and the truth of determinism is more complicated.  In speaking 
of freedom of action and freedom of the will as simply the ‘freedom to do what one 
wants to do’ and the ‘freedom to will what one wants to will,’ Frankfurt leaves it open 
that these freedoms could be compatible with the truth of determinism.  This is because 
the freedoms to do otherwise that are required for freedom of action and freedom of the 
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will – the freedom to act otherwise and will otherwise, respectively – could, presumably, 
be given compatibilist-friendly interpretations.  However, if Frankfurt wants to claim that 
these two freedoms really are compatible with the truth of determinism, then he has more 
work to do.  He would need to provide and defend analyses of the freedoms to act and 
will otherwise that are compatible with the truth of determinism.  In his only remarks 
about this, Frankfurt writes, “it is a vexed question just how ‘could have done otherwise’ 
is to be understood in contexts such as this one” (p. 19).  If Frankfurt believes that this is 
a vexed question and in the absence of providing a compatibilist-friendly account of the 
freedom to do otherwise, then he would not be entitled to claim that freedom of action 
and freedom of the will are in fact compatible with the truth of causal determinism. 
It is clear that Frankfurt is a compatibilist about the freedom required for moral 
responsibility, a kind of freedom that, on his view, does not involve the freedom to do 
otherwise.  Should we think that Frankfurt would also want to argue that his conceptions 
of freedom of action and freedom of the will are compatible with the truth of causal 
determinism, then we must interpret Frankfurt as needing to claim that the alternative 
possibilities required for such freedom are compatible with determinism.  He would then 
be, what John Martin Fischer (2006: 83) calls, a “compatibilist semicompatibilist”.  A 
semicompatibilist believes that “moral responsibility is compatible with causal 
determinism, even if causal determinism is incompatible with freedom to do otherwise” 
(Fischer 2006: 78).  A compatibilist semicompatibilist interprets the freedom to do 
otherwise in a compatibilist-friendly manner, even though he does not think that such 
freedom is required for moral responsibility.  An incompatibilist semicompatibilist, by 
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contrast, thinks that the freedom to do otherwise, while not necessary for moral 
responsibility, is incompatible with the truth of causal determinism.17 
 
4.3  Moral responsibility and second-order volitions. 
 Let us turn back to the account of freedom Frankfurt believes is required for a 
person to be morally responsible for what he does.  In Frankfurt’s view, a person acts 
with the freedom required for moral responsibility if and only if the desire “by which he 
was moved when he did it was his will because it was the will he wanted” (p. 19).  The 
meaning of this condition is not as clear as it might first appear.  What is in need of 
clarification is the precise nature of the relationship Frankfurt envisages between the 
second-order volition of a morally responsible agent and his motivating desire.  To see 
this, we can ask: what does it mean to say of a person who acts with this kind of freedom 
that the desire that moved him ‘was his will because it was the will he wanted’? 
 On the most natural interpretation of what Frankfurt intended to communicate, to 
say that the desire that moved the person ‘was his will because it was the will he wanted’ 
is to say that his desiring to be moved by that desire caused that desire to move him.  On 
this interpretation of Frankfurt’s condition, the point of speaking of second-order 
volitions in connection with a person’s moral responsibility is to ensure that a person has 
some sort of causal control over the first-order desires that motivate him.  He exercises 
control over his own motivations, on this picture, in the sense that it is his desiring to be 
moved by a particular desire that causes him to act from that desire. 
 
17 Fischer says, “I am an agnostic semicompatibilist, although I am perhaps a latently 
incompatibilist semicompatibilist” (2006: 83). 
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 While on the face of it, this causal reading is the most natural interpretation of 
what Frankfurt had in mind in describing the conditions for moral responsibility – and a 
good number of philosophers interpret him in this way18 – this reading omits a key 
feature of second-order volitions that Frankfurt stresses in his article: their place in 
grounding or explaining the sense in which a person can ‘identify’ himself with, and 
thereby more truly own, his first-order desires. 
 Frankfurt makes these points about a person’s identification with his desires in 
connection with his example of the unwilling drug addict.  This addict is a person who 
takes the drug in spite of himself.  He has both a desire to take the drug and a desire not 
to take it.  While both these desires “are his, to be sure,” the addict “identifies himself … 
through the formation of a second-order volition with one rather than with the other of his 
conflicting first-order desires,” making “one of them more truly his own and, in doing 
so,” withdrawing “himself from the other” (p. 13).  It is in virtue of his identification with 
his desire not to take the drug that we can speak of the addict as being ‘unwilling,’ since 
the desire from which he acts – his desire for the drug – is not the desire that he wants to 
be moved by. 
 In these remarks, Frankfurt seems to be distinguishing between two different 
senses in which a person’s desires can be said to be ‘his’.  On the one hand, there is the 
brute or trivial sense in which all of a person’s desires are his desires simply in virtue of 
 
18 Eleonore Stump (1988), for instance, writes in this connection that Frankfurt requires 
that a morally responsible agent “has the first-order volitions he has because of his 
second-order volitions (that is, his second-order volitions have, directly or indirectly, 
produced his first-order volitions)” (p. 397).  Fischer (1986) and Kane (1996) also 
describe Frankfurt’s view in terms of an individual’s morally responsible behavior as 
being caused by his second-order volitions in this way. 
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their being a part of his mental life.  In this respect, the unwilling addict can be said to 
‘own’ both of his conflicting first-order desires: his desire to take the drug, and his desire 
not to take it.  On the other hand, there is a stronger – what we might call, a more 
genuine, true, or complete – sense of ownership a person can have with respect to his 
desires.  It is when a person identifies himself with a desire, something he does by 
desiring to be moved by that desire, that the desire belongs to him in this stronger sense. 
 Given the important role that second-order volitions have for Frankfurt in 
explaining how a person can identify himself with his desires, this suggests an alternative 
reading of Frankfurt’s condition for morally responsible agency.  On this alternative 
picture of Frankfurt’s condition, to say that the desire that moved the person ‘was his will 
because it was the will he wanted’ is not to say that his desiring to be moved by that 
desire caused him to act from it.  Rather, it is to say that it is by desiring to be moved by 
that desire that the person identifies himself with his motivating desire, and so when he 
acts from it, he acts from a desire that is truly ‘his’.  We can bring out this alternative 
reading by supplying the following emphasis to Frankfurt’s remark: a person acts with 
the freedom required for moral responsibility if and only if “the will by which he was 
moved when he did it was his will because it was the will he wanted” (p. 19).  On this 
ownership interpretation of Frankfurt’s condition, the point of speaking of second-order 
volitions in connection with a person’s moral responsibility is not to ensure that the 
person has some sort of causal control over the motivations of his behavior but, instead, 
to secure the idea that a morally responsible agent acts from desires he genuinely owns, 
motivations that are truly ‘his’. 
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 It is unclear which interpretation of his condition Frankfurt intended.  His most 
pertinent remarks about it are contained in his description of the willing drug addict, an 
addict who, unlike the unwilling addict, is “altogether delighted with his condition” (p. 
19).  He is a ‘willing’ addict in the sense that it his desire to take the drug, rather than his 
desire not to take it, that he wants to be moved by.  Frankfurt also says that this addict 
meets his condition for the freedom required for moral responsibility since his desire for 
the drug is his will because it was the will he wanted.  On the one hand, Frankfurt 
describes the willing addict’s situation “as involving the overdetermination of his first-
order desire to take the drug.  The desire is his effective desire because he is 
physiologically addicted.  But it is his effective desire also because he wanted it to be” 
(pp. 19-20).  This overdetermination remark implies that Frankfurt has the causal reading 
in mind.  It seems that he wants to convey the thought that there are two things true of the 
addict that are individually sufficient to ensure that his desire for the drug is effective: 
that his desire is addictive, and that his desire is the one he wants to be moved by.19 
 However, Frankfurt follows this remark by suggesting that “by his second-order 
desire that his desire for the drug should be effective, he has made his will his own” (p. 
20).  This suggests the possibility of the ownership reading, that the point of citing 
second-order volitions in connection with a person’s moral responsibility is to secure the 
 
19 Fitting the overdetermination remark with the ownership reading is more difficult.  If 
what Frankfurt had in mind is that it was overdetermined that the willing addict identifies 
himself with his desire to take the drug, then this means that Frankfurt would be holding 
that a sufficient condition for a person to identify himself with a desire is that that desire 
is addictive.  But, in the case of the unwilling addict, whose desire for the drug is 
addictive, Frankfurt claims that he does not identify himself with this desire. 
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sense in which, when acting with the freedom required for moral responsibility, a person 
acts from desires that are truly his. 
 
4.4  Second-order volitions and self-expression. 
 What is most interesting about these opposing interpretations of Frankfurt’s 
condition is not simply that there is an ambiguity in his account that Frankfurt does not 
clearly resolve, but that the conflict brings to light the broader issue of the general picture 
of freedom Frankfurt wants to capture by casting a person’s moral responsibility in terms 
of his second-order volitions.  We know that Frankfurt rejects the claim that moral 
responsibility requires the freedom to do otherwise.  But what kind of freedom, in the 
broadest sense, does Frankfurt believe moral responsibility requires? 
Though Frankfurt is not explicit in answering this question, I follow many 
philosophers in viewing him as arguing that the freedom people must act with in order to 
be morally responsible for their behavior is, what we can call, the freedom of self-
expression.  On the self-expression model, people act with the freedom required for 
moral responsibility to the extent that their actions reflect who they really are, as people – 
to the extent that their actions reflect their ‘true,’ ‘deep,’ or ‘real’ selves, as it is 
sometimes put.20  Interpreting Frankfurt’s view along self-expression lines implies that 
the point of speaking of a person’s second-order volitions in connection with his moral 
responsibility is to secure the sense in which the desires from which he acts are, in some 
 
20 Susan Wolf (1987, 1990) coined the terms ‘deep’ and ‘real’ self in this connection.  
Others who interpret Frankfurt in a similar way include Nomy Arpaly and Timothy 
Schroeder (1999), Laura Waddell Ekstrom (2005), Robert Kane (2005), Elinor Mason 
(2005), and Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (2003). 
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way, a fundamental part of his self; in acting from these desires, the person’s action will 
then reflect who he really is, as a person.   
This understanding of Frankfurt’s project can help us decide whether the causal 
reading or the ownership reading is the best way to interpret Frankfurt’s condition.  In 
particular, we can ask what makes it the case that the desire that motivates the morally 
responsible agent is part of his fundamental self?  Is it the fact that he causes himself to 
be moved by it (the causal reading) or the fact that he ‘identifies’ himself with it (the 
ownership reading)?  On the face of it, I think that the ownership reading gives the more 
plausible answer to this question.  The difference can be put in terms of whether we 
should think of a person’s fundamental self as composed of those desires with which he 
identifies himself or those desires that he causes himself to act from.  The problem with 
the latter account, the causal reading, is that there are surely desires that are part of a 
person’s fundamental self that are not desires that, for one reason or another, lead the 
person to act. 
 As an example, consider Frankfurt’s case of the unwilling drug addict.  Frankfurt 
implies that it is this addict’s desire not to take the drug, rather than his desire to take it 
(which is the desire that moves him), that is the more fundamental part of him.  
According to the explanation implied by the causal reading, it is when a desire is one 
from which a person acts – one that he causes himself to act from, more specifically – 
that a desire becomes part of the person’s ‘true’ self.  This provides no way to explain 
how it is the unwilling addict’s desire not to take the drug, which is a desire that fails to 
motivate him, that is part of his fundamental self.  Perhaps an alternative explanation for 
these kinds of cases can be given, but all things equal, it is preferable to have a consistent 
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explanation across all cases.  The account that falls out of the ownership reading – that 
what makes it the case that a desire is part of a person’s fundamental self is that he 
identifies himself with it – covers both kinds of case.  It alone explains how a desire can 
be part of a person’s ‘true’ self whether or not it is one from which the person acts. 
 Reflection on the unwilling addict case brings up a broader problem that threatens 
to undermine any account of moral responsibility based on the idea of self-expression.  
This is the issue of how, pre-theoretically, we should identify those parts of a person’s 
self that are more fundamental to who he is than other parts.  After all, there is a 
straightforward sense in which who this person ‘really is’ is a drug addict, even if he 
identifies himself with his desire not to take the drug rather than with his desire to take it.  
‘He really is a drug addict,’ we might say, ‘even though he doesn’t want to be one.’  To 
develop this point, we might distinguish between ‘who a person really is’ on the one hand 
and ‘who a person really wants to be’ on the other, and insist – against the self-expression 
theorist – that it is not at all obvious that we should understand the former in terms of the 
latter, that is, understand who a person really is in terms of who he really wants to be. 
 I think that Frankfurt and his defenders should reply by granting that while it is 
true that the unwilling addict is an addict no matter what the content of his second-order 
volitions, there is also a further understanding of the idea of a person’s ‘true’ or 
fundamental self in which his desire for the drug would not be a part.  This is the idea of 
a person’s fundamental self that we recognize when we say, in excusing the addict, ‘it 
wasn’t really him, it was the drug that was moving him.’  (Arpaly and Schroeder [1999] 
cite this excuse in this connection.)  The idea here is that there is some part of this 
person’s self, besides his addiction, that is more fundamental to who he really is.  And it 
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is this part of the person’s self, the self-expression theorist should insist, that a person’s 
action must reflect in order for him to be morally responsible for it. 
 
4.5  The Willing drug addict. 
 I want to finish this chapter by looking in more detail at Frankfurt’s example of 
the willing drug addict which throws further light on Frankfurt’s theory.  Frankfurt 
explicitly introduces this example to illustrate his claim that “it is not true that a person is 
morally responsible for what he has done only if his will was free when he did it” (p. 18).  
Though the willing addict could not have willed otherwise, his addiction ensuring that his 
desire for the drug is his will, his relationship to his will – its being ‘his will because it 
was the will he wanted’ – means that, in Frankfurt’s view, he acts with the freedom 
required for moral responsibility.  What is striking about this case is that it seems just as 
much an apparent counterexample to PAP as the ‘Frankfurt cases,’ the examples 
Frankfurt developed in his earlier paper, ‘Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility 
(1969).  In both kinds of case, a person apparently acts with the freedom required for 
moral responsibility despite the fact that some feature of the situation – Black’s presence 
or the addict’s addiction – allegedly ensures that the person could not have done 
otherwise. 
 What is also striking about the cases is not simply the symmetry between them 
but also the difference in the extent to which these examples have been deployed as 
counterexamples to PAP.  While it is commonplace to use the Frankfurt cases as a 
counterexample to this principle, one rarely – if ever – finds the willing addict case being 
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used to draw the same conclusion.21  Why have PAP rejecters neglected to use the 
willing addict case as a counterexample to PAP? 
 I suspect that those wanting to reject PAP have failed to use the willing addict 
case to undermine the principle because they have the intuition that his addiction takes 
away some of his moral responsibility even though they do not have the corresponding 
intuition that Black’s presence in the Frankfurt case takes away some of Jones’ 
responsibility.  Indeed, some philosophers suggest that an addict cannot be morally 
responsible for taking a drug under any circumstances, no matter what the nature of his 
higher-order satisfaction with his behavior.  Don Locke (1975), for instance, argues that 
the distinction between the moral responsibilities of the unwilling and willing addicts is 
“implausible given that they are both equally addicts.”  He goes on to say that “while I 
can see a respect on which the willing addict might be regarded as more reprehensible, in 
that his desires are as depraved as his actions, this does not seem to make any difference 
to his responsibility for his behavior” (p. 100).22  Of course, one question that should be 
 
21 For instance, none of the essays in a recent book collection devoted to Frankfurt’s 
work concerning the relationship between moral responsibility and alternative 
possibilities (Widerker & McKenna, 2003) even mentions the willing addict case. 
22 I also find this uncertainty in intuition about whether or not an addiction takes away in 
principle an addict’s moral responsibility when taking the drug in Fischer’s work.  In 
early work, after discussing the contrast between the unwilling and the willing addict, 
Fischer (1986) claims that “it would be desirable to have a theory of responsibility that 
would explain why such agents as … the ‘happy addict’ are responsible for their actions, 
although they couldn’t have done otherwise” (p. 43).  In more recent work, however, he 
seems to back away from this desideratum, at least implicitly.  For instance, writing with 
Mark Ravizza (Fischer & Ravizza, 1998: 48), he speaks of drug addicts as being those 
who we intuitively think of as not responsible for their actions.  They consider a drug 
addict who takes a drug and argue that the mechanism that led to his action cannot be 
described as any type of normal ‘deliberation’ because of it were, then the addict would, 
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pressed against philosophers who believe that PAP is false but also think that the addict’s 
addiction takes away some of his responsibility is what is it about his addiction that 
attenuates his moral responsibility?  The answer on their part had better not be that the 
addiction takes away from the person’s responsibility because it deprives him of 
alternative possibilities.  But if it is not this feature of his addiction that makes it morally 
relevant, then what other explanation could there be? 
 Setting this question aside, I want to finish this chapter by developing an 
argument against PAP using the willing addict case, one that rejects the assumption made 
by Locke that an addict can never be responsible for his drug-taking under any 
circumstances.  The argument has two stages. 
 First, the PAP rejecter should use the willing drug addict to challenge the claim 
that a drug addict can never be morally responsible for taking a drug.  Comparison of the 
willing addict case with the unwilling addict case should lead us to consider the question, 
‘Under what conditions should an addiction exculpate?’  Comparing the willing addict 
case with the unwilling addict case might elicit the intuition that an addiction will not 
always exculpate.  The willing addict wants his desire for the drug to move him to act.  
By desiring that it should move him, the addict has identified himself with this desire.  
This act of identification means that he will be frustrated should any other desire besides 
his desire for the drug move him to act.  By contrast, the unwilling addict acts from a 
desire that he does not want to be moved by.  In fact, he wants a different desire to move 
him, his desire not to take the drug.  To this extent, the unwilling addict is frustrated with 
 
according to their view, be morally responsible for his action (and they do not want this 
result). 
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the nature of his will.  The difference in these two cases, particularly with respect to the 
satisfaction these addicts have with their motivating desires, might lead us to reasonably 
cast doubt on the claim that addiction always exculpates.  Having conceded that there 
might be circumstances in which an addiction may not excuse the person, let us move to 
the second step of the argument. 
 The second step of the argument consists in arguing that there is a morally 
relevant difference in the responsibility both addicts bear towards their actions.  The 
unwilling addict acts from a desire that he does not identify himself with.  This ensures, 
as Frankfurt puts it, that “the force moving him to take the drug is a force other than his 
own” (p. 13).  It might seem for this reason – the reason that the addict is not being 
moved by a desire that is truly his – inappropriate to blame him for taking the drug.  Yet 
the willing addict does identify himself with the source of his action.  He wants to be 
moved by his desire for the drug.  So, the argument goes, it could be appropriate to blame 
the willing addict for this reason, that his motivating desire is a desire that is a true part of 
him, one he has genuine ownership over. 
 This difference in the extent to which these two addicts are moved by desires that 
are fully theirs is, by this line of reasoning, a morally relevant difference.  If this is right, 
then we have a counterexample to PAP, since neither addict has the freedom to do 
otherwise.  By highlighting the difference in degree of ownership the two addicts have 
with respect to their wills, we have constructed an argument in which, it is alleged, a 
person can act with the freedom required for moral responsibility despite lacking the 
freedom to do otherwise. 
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 How persuasive is this argument?  Should it lead us to abandon PAP?  I suspect 
not.  For many, myself included, the intuitions supporting PAP brought to light by asking 
the question, ‘if you want to blame the willing addict, what should he have done instead?’ 
would count against thinking the addict morally responsible for his drug-taking.  In fact, 
reflection on the fact that there is no good answer to what the addict should have done 
instead should lead us, I think, to embrace Locke’s remarks about the responsibility of an 
addict.  Because they could not have done otherwise, neither addict can be morally 
responsible for what they did.  Yet the difference in the relationship both addicts bear 
towards their wills might make a morally relevant difference in the assessment of their 
moral character.  The willing addict can be judged more reprehensible, as Locke 
suggests, if not morally responsible.  (I explore the difference between judgments of 













Chapter Five: Evaluating Frankfurt’s Hierarchical Account 
 
 In the previous chapter, I offered what I believe to be the most plausible 
interpretation of Frankfurt’s positive account of the freedom required for moral 
responsibility.  In this chapter, I want to evaluate it.  I focus on two criticisms.  First, I 
assess whether a person must identify himself with his motivating desire in order to be 
morally responsible as Frankfurt suggests.  I focus in particular on apparent 
counterexamples that suggest that identification is not necessary, though I argue that 
Frankfurt and his defenders have the apparatus to avoid these alleged counterexamples. 
 Assuming that identification is necessary for responsibility, the second criticism I 
look at focuses on whether Frankfurt’s condition that the first-order desire from which a 
person acts is his will because it was the will he wanted is sufficient to capture the way in 
which a morally responsible agent identifies himself with his motivating desire.  I argue 
that this criticism is much more troubling for Frankfurt’s account than the first one.  
Criticisms that Frankfurt’s condition is not sufficient for identification are not rare, but I 
try to break new ground by arguing that his account is not subject to one regress 
difficulty, as is commonly argued, but to two independent regress problems.   
 
5.1  Is Frankfurt’s condition necessary for moral responsibility? 
 The first criticism to be considered concerns whether identification is necessary 
for moral responsibility.   R. Jay Wallace (1994) claims that Frankfurt’s condition is not 
necessary for the freedom moral responsibility requires on the grounds that we blame 
people even when they “act spontaneously” or “against their better judgment” even 
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though “in none of these cases do their actions reflect their higher-order identifications” 
(p. 264).  Recasting this a little, we can ask whether a person must identify himself with 
motivating desire in order to be blameworthy or praiseworthy for what he does.  
Of the cases mentioned by Wallace, the claim that weak-willed actions – that is, 
behaving against one’s better judgment – are counterexamples is unconvincing.  When a 
person knowingly acts against his moral judgment, it does not follow – as Wallace and 
other (for instance, Kane [2005]) have claimed – that the individual will be failing to act 
from a desire that he has identified with, a desire that is his will because it was the will he 
wanted.  This is because Frankfurt distinguishes between a person’s identification on the 
one hand, and his moral judgment on the other.  With this difference in hand, he denies 
that “a person’s second-order volitions necessarily manifest a moral stance on his part 
towards his first-order desires.”  In fact, “it may not be from the point of view of morality 
that the person evaluates his first-order desires” (p. 13, footnote 6).  On Frankfurt’s view, 
a person may identify himself with a certain desire knowing full well that it would be 
morally wrong for him to act from it.  Perhaps he does not care about morality, about 
behaving morally, or perhaps he accepts his immoral inclinations.  Either way, Frankfurt 
can hold a person responsible for acting against his moral judgment without undermining 
his own theory so long as the person identifies with his motivations. 
 Wallace’s suggestion that acting spontaneously – or acting ‘on a whim,’ as 
Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (2003) puts it in his argument against Frankfurt – is a 
counterexample to Frankfurt’s condition is a more promising criticism.  If a person acts 
spontaneously, without having identified himself with his motivating desire, it does seem, 
on the face of it, “implausible” (p. 372), as Lippert-Rasmussen suggests, to deny that the 
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person is responsible simply because he fails to form a second-order volition.  One line of 
response here is to point out that Frankfurt insists that a person can form his second-order 
volitions in a “capricious and irresponsible” manner, so identify himself by “giving no 
serious consideration to what is at stake” (p. 13, footnote 6).  With such little restriction 
on the conditions of their formation, perhaps Frankfurt and his defenders could insist that 
in these instances of apparently spontaneous behavior, the person really does identify 
himself with his motivating desire, albeit spontaneously and without a period of sustained 
reflection. 
 But this reply is no good in the face of a critic who wants to stipulate an example 
in which a person acts from a first-order desire without having formed a second-order 
volition of any kind, neither towards his motivating desire nor towards some other desire.  
I think that Frankfurt’s best response here is to fight intuition with intuition.  On the one 
hand, there is no doubt some intuitive pull to think that such a person ought to be worthy 
of blame or praise for his behavior.  On the other hand, though, Frankfurt and his 
defenders should insist that there are other intuitions supporting the claim that the proper 
judgment is that a person who has not identified himself with his motivations is not 
morally responsible.  The point of speaking of identification, remember, is to secure the 
sense in which morally responsible behavior reflects the self.  With this as background, 
consider the ‘wanton,’ an individual who lacks second-order volitions, and so has no 
genuine self to which his behavior can be attributed, no proper self that his actions can 
reflect.  The wanton’s behavior is animalistic, simply a result of his brute urges.  When a 
person acts from mere desire alone without identifying himself with his motivations, then 
while he has at least the possibility of a genuine self that his actions could reflect (unlike 
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the wanton), on this occasion his behavior is importantly ‘wanton-like’; it is simple brute 
behavior that does not express the self.  And since we have the intuition that the wanton 
is not responsible for what he does on the grounds that his behavior is not self-expressive, 
this gives some reason to think that a person is not morally responsible for his 
spontaneous actions for similar reasons, when his actions are not expressive of his self. 
 
5.2  Can Frankfurt’s condition capture identification? 
 In the previous section, I argued that Frankfurt’s suggestion that identification is 
necessary for moral responsibility can be defended against apparent counterexamples.  
Granting that some kind of identification is necessary, I now want to consider whether or 
not Frankfurt’s condition is sufficient to capture the sense in which a person identifies 
himself with his motivating desire when morally responsible for what he does.   
Some argue that Frankfurt’s condition is not sufficient on the grounds that 
second-order volitions are, after all, ‘merely’ desires; “since second-order volitions are 
themselves simply desires,” writes Gary Watson (1975), “to add them to the context of 
conflict is just to increase the number of contenders; it is not to give any special place to 
any of those in contention” (p. 218).  I am not entirely clear about how this criticism 
should be understood.  On one reading of it, what is objectionable is the fact that second-
order volitions share with their first-order objects the property of being desires, and a 
desire no matter what its level in a hierarchy lacks the necessary significance required to 
confer identification.  (Watson might have this argument in mind since he claims that it is 
only a person’s values, as opposed to his desires, that carry enough significance to speak 
for a person in this respect.)  If this is how the criticism is meant to be taken, then I do not 
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find it persuasive.  It is especially unclear why we should think that the fact that second-
order volitions are kinds of desire would prevent them from explaining the sense in which 
some of a person’s first-order desires are more truly his own than others. 
Another way to read Watson’s remarks, though, is as drawing attention to the fact 
that speaking of second-order volitions – desires for desires – opens up the possibility of 
desires of a higher order than the second level.  This phenomenon may cast doubt on the 
sufficiency of Frankfurt’s original condition, as I now want to explain.  In fact, I think 
that Frankfurt is trying to express this kind of worry in the following passage from his 
original paper: 
[One] complexity is that a person may have, especially if his second-order 
volitions are in conflict, desires and volitions of a higher-order than the second.  
There is no theoretical limit to the length of the series of higher and higher orders; 
nothing except common sense and, perhaps, a saving fatigue prevents an 
individual from obsessively refusing to identify with any of his desires until he 
forms a desire of the next higher order.  The tendency to generate such a series of 
acts of forming desires, which would be a case of humanization run wild … leads 
towards the destruction of the person (p. 16). 
This passage is suggestive but opaque.  Particularly puzzling is Frankfurt’s claim 
that a person can ‘refuse to identify himself with a desire until he forms a desire of the 
next higher order.’  After all, according to Frankfurt’s account, to identify oneself with a 
desire just is to form a higher-order volition towards it.  However, the worry I think that 
Frankfurt is trying to express here is that once we use the idea of a hierarchy of desires to 
explain identification, we open up the possibility that a person could reflect on the 
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desirability of his second-order volition from the third-order level thus undermining the 
efficacy of that volition to explain the way in which his motivating desire is truly his.  I 
think that Frankfurt is aware that, as it stands, his account of identification relying on 
second-order volitions alone is incomplete; identification requires something more than 
desiring to be moved by the particular desire. 
To explain, consider an example of a hard-working student who finds himself 
with a stray desire to get drunk as well as his usual desire to study.  As is his way, he 
forms a second-order volition towards his desire to work.  He wants his desire to study 
rather than his desire to drink to move him to act.  He meets Frankfurt’s original 
condition, so according to Frankfurt’s original picture, he acts with the freedom required 
for moral responsibility should he be moved by his desire to study.  However, we can see 
that Frankfurt’s condition is not sufficient to explain the student’s identifying himself 
with his motivating desire.  Imagine that the student is conflicted about his moral 
character, about the kind of person he is, and being fed up with his strict work ethos, he 
desires, from the third-order level, not to desire to be moved by his desire to study.  He 
desires to rid himself of his second-order volition, one that reflects, as it were, his now 
unwanted studious disposition.  While on the one hand, he wants his desire to study to 
move him, on the other hand, this is a second-order volition that because of his personal 
conflict he wishes not to have.  But, how can his second-order volition explain his 
identification with his motivating desire under these circumstances if it is a desire that he 
does not want to have?  Surely, any authority his volition would otherwise have to 
explain how his motivating desire is truly his is undermined by the fact that it is volition 
the person desires not to have. 
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While the student example shows that Frankfurt’s condition is not sufficient to 
capture the sense in which a person binds himself with his motivating desire when 
morally responsible for what he does, I think that the difficulty Frankfurt gestures at in 
the passage I quoted is broader than that I have sketched in the conflicted student 
example.  I think that the problem does not simply turn on the fact that the student desires 
not to have the desire to be moved by his desire to study.  Rather, the difficulty arises as 
soon as a person “put[s] his relationship to it [his second-order volition] in question,” as 
Frankfurt (2002) puts it in a later paper, something he does simply by “reflecting on” it 
(p. 86).  By mentally ‘stepping back,’ so to speak, and reflecting on whether or not he 
wants to desire to be moved by his desire to work, the student has undermined the 
authority his volition would otherwise have to explain his identification with his desire to 
study.  After all, how can his second-order volition explain how this is a desire he more 
truly owns if it is a desire that the person is questioning whether or not he wants to have? 
The upshot of these considerations is that simply desiring to be moved by a desire 
is not enough for a person to identify himself with his motivating desire since he could 
meet this condition while also questioning whether or not he wants to want to be moved 
by it.  So long as this possibility is open, Frankfurt’s account of identification is 
incomplete. 
 
5.3  Frankfurt’s response. 
 Following the passage of his that I quoted, Frankfurt offers what I take to be a 
solution to the difficulty I have been discussing, an addition to his original condition 
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intended to close off the possibility that a person could undermine his identification by 
questioning the desirability of his second-order volition.  He writes: 
It is possible, however, to terminate such a series of acts [i.e., the formation of 
desires of a higher order than the second level] without cutting it off arbitrarily.  
When a person identifies himself decisively with one of his first-order desires, this 
commitment ‘resounds’ throughout the potentially endless array of higher orders.  
Consider a person who, without reservation or conflict, wants to be motivated by 
the desire to concentrate on his work.  The fact that his second-order volition is a 
decisive one means that there is no room for questions concerning the pertinence 
of desires or volitions of higher orders.  Suppose the person is asked whether he 
wants to want to concentrate on his work.  He can properly insist that this 
question concerning a third-order desire does not arise.  It would be a mistake to 
claim that, because he has not considered whether he wants the second-order 
volition he has formed, he is indifferent to the question of whether it is with this 
volition or with some other than he wants his will to accord.  The decisiveness of 
the commitment means that he has decided that no further question about his 
second-order volition, at any higher order, remains to be asked (p. 16). 
As I read this passage, Frankfurt suggests in the last line of his remarks that his 
original account should be supplemented with the condition that in order for a person to 
identify himself with his motivating desire (and hence act with the freedom required for 
moral responsibility) he must make a decision that he has no questions about the 
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pertinence of his second-order volition.23  To avoid the possibility that a person could 
undermine the efficacy his second-order volition would otherwise have to explain how 
his motivating desire is truly his by reflecting on its desirability, Frankfurt requires that a 
person must make a decision that he has no questions about its pertinence.  Does this 
response successfully avoid the original problem?  Is Frankfurt’s new account of 
identification sound?  I consider these questions in the next section. 
 
5.4  Evaluating Frankfurt’s appeal to decision. 
 Though I think that Frankfurt’s response is unsuccessful, I want to make this 
argument by showing how a commonly cited argument against Frankfurt’s response is 
unsound.  In a famous critique of Frankfurt’s article, Watson (1975) argues that either 
Frankfurt’s reply here: 
… is lame or it reveals that the notion of a higher-order volition is not the 
fundamental one.  We wanted to know what prevents wantonness with regard to 
one’s higher-order volitions.  What gives these volitions any special relation to 
‘oneself’?  It is unhelpful to answer that one makes a ‘decisive commitment,’ 
 
23 Frankfurt goes on to say that “it is relatively unimportant whether we explain this [a 
person’s making a decision] by saying that this commitment generates an endless series 
of confirming desires of higher orders, or by saying that the commitment is tantamount to 
a dissolution of the pointedness of all questions concerning higher orders of desire” (pp. 
16-17).  I think that this shows that what bothered Frankfurt about his initial account is 
not that a person might actually form desires of a higher order than the second level (for 
he allows that such desires might be ‘implicitly’ generated as a result of the decision a 
person makes about this second-order volition).  Rather, what concerns him, and the 
reason for which he realized his initial account was insufficient, was that a person might 
want to be a moved by a particular desire yet at the same time question whether or not he 
wants to want to be moved by that desire. 
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where this just means that an interminable ascent to higher orders is not going to 
be permitted.  This is arbitrary (p. 218). 
This response, as stated, is unconvincing, and I am surprised when I frequently 
see it cited approvingly by other philosophers.  It is unpersuasive because Watson 
misunderstands Frankfurt’s solution to the problem.  Making a decisive commitment, on 
Frankfurt’s view, does not just mean – as Watson suggests – that ‘an interminable ascent 
to higher orders is not going to be permitted’.  Rather, it means that the person has made 
a decision that he has no questions about whether or not he wants to have his second-
order volition.  Since the possibility of a regress is eliminated as a result of the decision, 
its termination would not obviously be arbitrary, contrary to Watson’s claim. 
Perhaps, though, we can recast Watson’s objection so as to attribute the right view 
to Frankfurt but preserve the idea that the way in which the possibility of the regress is 
terminated is nonetheless arbitrary.  In particular, we can ask, for what reason does the 
person decide that he has no questions about his second-order volition?  If he makes this 
decision for no reason, or only because he is too tired to think any harder about it, then 
we might think that the regress is arbitrary because the decision was made arbitrarily.  
Another way to put this criticism is to say that by deciding that he is satisfied with his 
second-order volition, that he has no questions about whether or not he wants it, the 
person “accord[s] the higher-order attitude effective authority (p. 90, footnote 1), as 
Frankfurt (2002) puts it in a later paper.  The decision accords the volition authority to 
explain the way in which his motivating desire is truly his.  But how can the decision 
accord his volition this kind of authority if it was made out of laziness or tiredness? 
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One way to diagnose the plausibility of this objection is that if a person were to 
decide that he is satisfied with his second-order volition only because he was too tired to 
think any harder, then this decision does not have enough significance to accord his 
volition the authority to explain his identification with his desire; the decision would be 
half-hearted, we might say.  By way of response, I think that Frankfurt and his defenders 
should reject the conditional.  They should insist that no matter what leads the person to 
make his decision, even if tiredness, his making it ensures that he is not moved to wonder 
whether or not he wants to have his second-order volition.  Furthermore, this is what is 
key to avoid the possibility that he could stand back and reflect on its desirability.  So 
long as he makes this decision, he will not be moved to question his second-order 
volition. 
A better, and to my mind decisive, problem with Frankfurt’s appeal to decision is 
that it undermines his central claim that a person’s identification with his motivating 
desire must necessarily be understood in terms of a hierarchy of desires.  Introducing the 
notion of decision in the way Frankfurt does raises the question of why we cannot capture 
the difference between those desires that a person more truly owns and those he does not 
by reference to him deciding that he has no questions about whether or not he wants to 
have these desires.  On this picture, those first-order desires the person decides he has no 
questions about, no thoughts about whether or not he wants to have them, are those he 
more truly owns.  By contrast, it is those first-order desires that he has questions about 
from the second-order level, those that he has not decided he is satisfied with, that are not 
desires he identifies himself with.  Casting a person’s ownership of his first-order desires 
in this light, by decision alone, bypasses any appeal to higher-order desires. 
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Gary Watson hints at this criticism in a footnote to his 1987 paper, ‘Free action 
and free will,’ when he writes that if, according to Frankfurt, second-order volitions are: 
… desires plus something else [i.e., plus a decision that the person has no 
questions about them], then the hierarchical account has not after all given us an 
account of identification; moreover, there is no reason to think that such 
identification is necessarily higher-order (pp. 149-150, footnote 7). 
The point is that by granting decision a crucial role in his account, we can ask 
why we cannot dispense with second-order volitions altogether and simply couch those 
first-order desires a person more truly owns in terms of those desires he has decided that 
he has no questions about.  This, though, undermines Frankfurt’s central idea of 
understanding identification, and the freedom required for moral responsibility, in terms 
of a hierarchy of desires.  We can emphasize the point against some remarks by David 
Zimmerman (1981), a defender of hierarchical views.  Zimmerman writes: 
The idea is to come up with some stance which can be a source of identification 
and internality, but which will not generate a regress.  Frankfurt believes that 
decision is such a stance (p. 359). 
But if decision can be such a stance, then why must we resort to a hierarchy of 
desires to explain identification?  Instead, we can use decision as the key explanatory 
notion and argue that a person identifies himself with a certain desire by virtue of making 
a decision that he has no questions about whether or not he wants to have that desire.  It is 
 89
                                                
when a person has not made such a decision, when he questions whether he wants to have 
the motivations that he does, that he fails to identify himself with them.24 
 
5.5  The second regress problem. 
 Though it has commonly been argued that Frankfurt’s account is susceptible to 
problems of a regress of higher order desires, I think that the regress difficulty is more 
subtle than has been appreciated.  In particular, I think that there are two regress 
difficulties to which Frankfurt’s view is subject, and the solutions Frankfurt offers in both 
instances undermine his central argument that identification is necessarily a matter of 
higher order desires.  On the one hand, according to the difficulty I have been sketching, 
Frankfurt’s original condition is not sufficient for identification because it is consistent 
with the person putting his own relationship to his second-order volition in question by 
mentally stepping back to the third-order level and asking himself whether or not he 
wants to have that volition.  Questioning whether or not he desires to have his second-
order volition undermines the efficacy that volition would otherwise have to explain the 
way in which the person identifies himself with his desire.  On the other hand, there is a 
second regress problem that is different from the one I have outlined so far.  According to 
the second regress difficulty, Frankfurt’s condition is not sufficient for identification not 
 
24 One response Frankfurt and his defenders might make to my criticism is that if we 
couch identification solely by reference to decisions without any appeal to second-order 
volitions, then we have omitted reference to the essential characteristic of a person: the 
possession of second-order volitions.  The difference between a person and a ‘wanton,’ a 
creature who is moved by brute desire alone, is in his capacity to form preferences about 
what desires he wants to move him.  However, we could still keep this criterion for 
personhood while limiting attributions of responsibility only to persons.  There would 
 90
                                                                                                                                                
because it does not rule out a possible regress – the possibility that a person could 
question the desirability of his second-order volition – but, instead, because it entails an 
actual regress of volitions beyond the second level.  Let me explain. 
 On Frankfurt’s original view, a person’s identification with his motivating desire 
is constituted by his forming a second-order volition towards that desire.  However, 
presumably his second-order volition can only confer genuine ownership of his 
motivating desires if it itself is a desire he identifies himself with.  By Frankfurt’s 
condition, this would require positing a third-order volition to explain how he identifies 
himself with his second-order volition.  But presumably the person’s third-order volition 
can only convey true ownership of his second-order volition if it is also one he identifies 
himself with.  And this requires positing a fourth-order volition, and so on ad infinitum.  
Hence, Frankfurt’s account of identification commits him to an ever high order regress of 
desires, each necessary to confer the person’s more true ownership of his prior desire. 
These two regress difficulties are rarely pulled apart in critical discussions of 
Frankfurt’s work.  To give one recent example of this failure, Laura Waddell Ekstrom 
(2005) introduces what she calls ‘the regress problem’ as part of a footnote in the 
following way: 
The regress problem is generated as, when deciding what to do, one consults 
one’s desires concerning what to do.  But in order to avoid being wanton-like, and 
in the face of conflict among first-level desires, one ascends to the second level, 
asking oneself what one desires to desire to do.  What has often been noticed is 
 
though no longer be such a tight connection between responsibility attributions and the 
conditions for personhood. 
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that nothing seems to prevent one’s evaluative questioning of this second-level 
desire in turn, so that one asks what one desires to desire to do (p. 50, footnote 8). 
This is a clear statement of the first regress problem I discussed, the difficulty that 
follows from the fact that a person could satisfy Frankfurt’s original condition while also 
questioning whether or not he wants to have his second-order volition.  Yet when 
Ekstrom elaborates on the regress problem in the main body of the text, she presents the 
criticism differently, in terms of the second regress I introduced.  She writes: 
… the regress is especially problematic because ascension to higher and higher 
orders of desire is not only something that might occur, due to persistent self-
doubt or intra-level conflict.  Rather, it is something that must occur, as 
Frankfurt’s original account of ‘internality’ requires it.  What makes a first-level 
desire one’s own … is that one has a positive endorsement of it, in the form of a 
second-level volition.  But the second-level attitude can confer internality only if 
it is internal to the self; and applying the account of internality to this state 
requires a third-level endorsing state.  What makes the third-order desire one’s 
own is that one has a fourth-level desire for it; and so on (p. 50). 
 
5.6  Responding to the second regress problem. 
 There is little evidence in his 1971 paper that Frankfurt realized that his own 
account of identification appears to commit him to the existence of an ever higher order 
series of endorsing desires in a morally responsible agent, each necessary to confer 
ownership of the prior desire.  In fact, I am inclined to read much of his later work on 
identification as his attempt to avoid this regress.  Before I survey some of this work, 
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though, I want to first look at a fairly straightforward reply that has been made in the face 
of this regress.  Zimmerman (1981) responds to the difficulty by denying the truth of one 
of the premises on which the regress rests, the claim that a person’s second-order volition 
can only explain his identification with his motivating desire if it – his second-order 
volition – is itself a desire that the person identifies himself with.  If this premise is false, 
the regress would not arise for there would be no need to posit a third-order volition to 
explain the way in which the person identifies himself with his second-order volition.  
Zimmerman argues that if we want to provide a compatibilist-friendly account of the 
freedom for moral responsibility, then we have to accept that: 
… there is some point in the motivational hierarchy where the higher-order desire 
playing the crucial endorsing role is itself an unwilled, unendorsed part of the 
agent’s motivational equipment, to be explained in terms of non-motivational 
causes, either genetic or environmental (p. 359). 
This response is unlikely to persuade the critic who will likely see it as either a 
failure to take the regress seriously or as a reductio ad absurdum – if this is what is 
required in order to avoid the regress then so much the worse for Frankfurt’s account.  
After all, it is mysterious how some feature of a person’s mentality, his second-order 
volition in this case, could explain how a particular desire is truly ‘his’ if that segment of 
his mental life is not a part the person has any special connection to, if it is just an 
‘unendorsed’ part of him, to use Zimmerman’s phrase. 
As I mentioned earlier, I view much of Frankfurt’s later work on identification 
following his 1971 paper as an attempt by him to deal with this regress difficulty.  This 
work is dense but unsystematic.  In the following section, I want to give some indications 
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as to how I think it should be viewed.  I ultimately argue that as with his response to the 
first regress problem, Frankfurt’s later work undermines his original thesis since it 
commits him to the view that a person’s identification of himself with desires need not be 
understood in terms of a hierarchy of higher-order desires. 
 
5.7  Frankfurt’s later work on identification. 
 In his 1975 paper, ‘Three concepts of free action,’ Frankfurt makes the following 
remarks about second-order volitions: 
As for a person’s second-order volitions themselves, it is impossible for him to be 
a passive bystander to them.  They constitute his activity – i.e., his being active 
rather than passive – and the question of whether or not he identifies himself with 
them cannot arise.  It makes no sense to ask whether someone identifies himself 
with his identification of himself, unless this is intended simply as asking whether 
his identification is wholehearted and complete (p. 121). 
What should we make of these claims?  Frankfurt’s last sentence is puzzling as 
even Zimmerman, one of his staunchest defenders, admits.  Zimmerman says that: 
… it makes perfect sense to ask ‘whether someone identifies himself with his 
identification of himself,’ for despite the odd sound of the question, all it really 
comes to on … [Frankfurt’s] notion of identification is the question of whether 
someone’s second-order volition is in turn endorsed by a third-order volition, and 
this question is clearly in order (p. 358). 
As for the idea that the question of whether or not a person identifies himself with 
his second-order volitions cannot arise because these volitions ‘constitute’ his being 
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active rather than passive, I am ambivalent.  Frankfurt’s idea seems to be that this 
question cannot arise since a person necessarily identifies himself with them by virtue of 
these volitions constituting his activity.  But the crucial question of what it means for a 
person’s second-order volition to ‘constitute his activity’ is left unanswered. 
Perhaps the thought is that second-order volitions are typically ‘active’ 
undertakings on our part, the result of mental effort.  As Ekstrom (2005) points out, “a 
desire for having another desire (or for a certain desire to lead one to act, when or if one 
acts) is apparently not the sort of state that arrives unbidden” (p. 49).  And, so the 
argument goes, whenever a desire is produced as a result of mental effort or deliberation 
in this way, the desire is necessarily ‘his,’ in a significant sense.   
There are two problems with this suggestion though.  First, although many of our 
second-order volitions are no doubt produced by mental effort, not all are.  It is surely not 
a necessary truth that a person’s second-order volitions are formed as a result of mental 
effort.  Thus, simply because a person has a second-order volition, it does not follow that 
this constitutes his activity and so does not follow that the question of his identification 
with it cannot arise. Second, even if it were true that a person necessarily truly owns 
those parts of his mental life that come about as a result of effort, surely it is not a 
necessary truth that a person’s first-order desires cannot be formed in this manner.  
Should a person form a first-order desire as a result of mental effort on his part, then this 
desire would necessarily be fully ‘his,’ a desire with which he necessarily identifies 
himself without it being the case that he desires to have it. 
In his 1976 paper, ‘Identification and externality,’ Frankfurt broaches the new 
regress problem though he speaks of it in terms of ‘attitudes’ rather than desires and in 
 95
terms of ‘internality’ rather than identification and true ownership.  He writes that 
according to his hierarchical account, an attitude’s “internality will have to be accounted 
for by invoking a higher-order attitude – that is, an attitude toward an attitude” (p. 248).  
However:  
… the internality of this higher-order attitude will have to be accounted for in 
terms of an attitude of a still higher order,” meaning that “an infinite regress will 
be generated by any attempt to account for internality or externality in terms of 
attitudes (p. 248). 
Frankfurt suggests that the regress can be terminated by “making a particular kind 
of decision” (p. 250), though he says little about the content of such decision, calling the 
nature of decision “very obscure” (p. 251).  He insists, though, that the making of a 
decision by the individual would terminate the regress because “decisions, unlike desires 
or attitudes, do not seem susceptible both to internality and to externality” (p. 251, 
footnote 3). 
The suggestion from these admittedly sketchy remarks has the same problem as 
Frankfurt’s earlier appeal to the way in which one’s second-order volitions constitutes 
one’s activity.  In particular, we can ask why decisions are parts of a person’s mental life 
that are necessarily fully his.  And if the idea is that they are the products of mental effort, 
the result of some sort of ‘work,’ on our part, then, as with his remarks about second-
order volitions, we avoid the regress only at the expense of giving up Frankfurt’s central 
claim that identification must be understood in terms of a hierarchy of desires.  This is 
because, as noted earlier, it seems conceptually possible for a person to form a first-order 
desire as a result of some effort on his part, without desiring to have that desire.  I also 
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doubt that it is a necessary truth that decisions are made as a result of mental effort.  If 
this claim is false, then making a decision will not necessarily terminate the regress. 
In his 1992 paper, ‘The Faintest passion,’ Frankfurt suggests a different solution 
to this regress.  He implies that a person identifies himself with his second-order volition 
if and only if he is ‘satisfied’ with that volition, where satisfaction “is a state of the entire 
psychic system – a state constituted just by the absence of any tendency or inclination to 
alter its condition” (1999: 104).  This terminates the regress since satisfaction with one’s 
second-order volition is a negative state, in the sense that it requires “no adoption of any 
cognitive, attitudinal, affective, or intentional stance” (p. 104) and so “does not entail an 
endless proliferation of higher orders and desires” (p. 105). 
How can identification with a desire be explained in terms of an ‘absence of any 
tendency or inclination to alter one’s condition’?  I think that what Frankfurt has in mind 
is that a person identifies himself with his second-order volition to the extent that he has 
no questions about whether or not he wants to have that volition.  One problem with this 
idea is that the regress seems to be terminated arbitrarily, ceased simply because the 
person has no questions about his second-order volition.  A second difficulty is that if 
what explains a person’s identification with his second-order volition is the absence of 
any questions about it, then a person would seem to be able to identify himself with his 
motivating first-order desire if he has no questions about its pertinence from the second-
order level.  But this gives up on Frankfurt’s idea of couching identification in terms of a 
hierarchy of desires. 
Frankfurt is aware of this second objection to his solution.  By way of reply, he 
writes: 
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It is possible, of course, for someone to be satisfied with his first-order desire 
without in any way considering whether to endorse them.  In that case, he is 
identified with those first-order desires.  But insofar as his desires are utterly 
unreflective, he is to that extent not genuinely a person at all.  He is merely a 
wanton (pp. 105-106). 
Perhaps Frankfurt wants to claim that while we can say that a person who is 
‘satisfied’ with a certain first-order desire may identify with it in a sense, he cannot do so 
in the sense required for the freedom for moral responsibility because, given his lack of 
second-order volitions, he is not a person but merely a wanton – in other words, he is not 
a being who can, in principle, exercise the freedom for moral responsibility.  However, 
this puts pressure on being clear about Frankfurt’s criterion for personhood.  In his 
original 1971 paper, Frankfurt defines a person as a being who is “able to form … 
second-order desires” (p. 6), who has “the capacity for reflective self-evaluation that is 
manifested in the formation of second-order desires” (p. 7).  The point implied here is 
that so long as an individual is able to form second-order volitions then he counts as a 
person, he counts as a being to whom ‘freedom can be a problem,’ to borrow Frankfurt’s 
phrase.  And it seems to me that there is no reason to think that a person might have no 
questions about whether or not he wants to have his motivating desire while being able, 
in the relevant sense, to form a second-order volition towards it, were he to have 
questions about it.  The point, so far as ‘satisfaction’ is concerned, is that the individual is 
such that he has no inclination to form a second-order volition – not that, in principle, he 
cannot do so.  Merely because a person’s first-order desires are, on occasion, 
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‘unreflective,’ to use Frankfurt’s phrase, does not entail that he is not a person, and so 
does not entail that he cannot, in principle, exercise the freedom for moral responsibility. 
Alternatively, Frankfurt might mean to be claiming not that such an individual is a 
wanton simpliciter, but rather that he is a wanton with respect to those unreflective first-
order desires.  But I don’t see how this really helps.  Given Frankfurt’s own account of 
what explains a person’s identification in terms of satisfaction, it simply follows that if a 
person has a certain first-order desire and is such that he has no tendency or inclination 
within him to alter his condition, then he has identified himself with that desire and it is 
genuinely ‘his’ in the required sense.  Nothing in Frankfurt’s remarks above would seem 















Chapter Six: Undermining New Compatibilism I – Manipulation and  
Causal Responsibility 
  
In the previous chapter, I evaluated Frankfurt’s hierarchical account of the 
freedom required for moral responsibility.  In this chapter, I want to turn my attention 
away from Frankfurt’s particular account and look more generally at compatibilist views 
that try to capture moral responsibility’s freedom without reference to alternative 
possibilities.  These views can be thought of as an indirect attack on PAP.  This is 
because such views, developed by so called new compatibilists, turn on developing 
accounts of the freedom needed for moral responsibility that do not rely on the freedom 
to do otherwise.  If these conditions turn out to be sufficient to capture moral 
responsibility’s freedom, then PAP would be false.  With this challenge in mind, in this 
chapter I outline and evaluate two strategies in which PAP might be defended against 
these new compatibilist conceptions of freedom – the first involving manipulation cases 
and the second appealing to the difference between causal and moral responsibility.  
Despite my sympathies with the aims of these two strategies, I conclude that neither 
forms a decisive strike against the sufficiency of the new compatibilist conditions.  A 
compelling argument undermining new compatibilism will have to be found elsewhere, a 
challenge I take up in chapter seven. 
 
6.1  Self-expression and reasons-responsiveness. 
Generally speaking, new compatibilist accounts of moral responsibility – those 
that do not make use of the freedom to do otherwise – can be divided into two kinds 
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depending on whether they emphasize self-expression or responsiveness to reasons as the 
key freedom-relevant feature.  Frankfurt’s (1971) is the first new compatibilist view of 
the self-expression type.  On such a view, a person’s being moved by a motivational 
element with which he identifies ensures that his behavior is a reflection of a fundamental 
part of his self; it ensures, we might say, that his action reflects ‘who he really is,’ or 
‘where he really stands’ as a person.25 
Other philosophers have followed Frankfurt in trying to capture moral 
responsibility’s freedom in terms of actions that reflect certain privileged parts of the 
person’s psyche.  However, they have disagreed with him as to what part of a person’s 
self his behavior must reflect.  Gary Watson (1975), for instance, casts the freedom 
required for moral responsibility in terms of those action that are motivated by a person’s 
value judgments as opposed to his ‘mere’ desires.26  More recently, T. M. Scanlon (1998) 
ties free and responsible behavior to actions that reflect the individual’s judgment-
 
25 Describing his view about the relationship between freedom and moral responsibility, 
Frankfurt (1971) writes, “It is a mistake, however, to believe that someone acts freely 
only when he is free to do whatever he wants or that he acts of his own free will only if 
his will is free.  Suppose that a person has done what he wanted to do, that he did it 
because he wanted to do it, and that the will by which he was moved when he did it was 
his will because it was the will he wanted.  Then he did it freely and of his own free will 
… Under these conditions, it is quite irrelevant to the evaluation of his moral 
responsibility to inquire whether the alternatives that he opted against were actually 
available to him” (p. 19). 
26 Watson (1975) describes a person’s free actions – and, by implication, his morally 
responsible actions – as those that “flow from his evaluational system” (p. 216).  This 
system comprises “that set of considerations which, when combined with his factual 
beliefs (and probability estimates) yield judgments of the form: the thing for me to do in 
these circumstances, all things considered, is a” (p. 215).  The set of considerations to 
which Watson is referring include his values, defined as “those principles and ends which 
he – in a cool and non-self-deceptive moment – articulates as definitive of the good, 
fulfilling and defensible life” (p. 215). 
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sensitive attitudes, while Angela Smith (2005, 2008) speaks of such actions as being 
those that reflect the person’s rational judgments.27 
 Despite the differences in the details of their views, in my opinion Watson, 
Scanlon, and Smith share with Frankfurt the basic idea of understanding the freedom 
required for moral responsibility in terms of, what I call, the freedom of self-expression 
rather than the freedom to do otherwise.  On the self-expression model, a person acts with 
the freedom required for moral responsibility to the extent that his action reflects the part 
of his self that is most fundamental to who he really is, as a person.  While Frankfurt, 
Watson, Scanlon, and Smith disagree as to what constitutes the part of a person’s self that 
is really ‘him’ – whether it is his identified desires, his considered values, his judgment-
sensitive attitudes, or his rational judgments – the important point is that they agree that 
self-expression is all the freedom required for moral responsibility.  And if this were true, 
then PAP would be undermined.  This is because in order for a person’s action to reflect 
his ‘true’ self, it is not the case that he must have been free to do otherwise. 
 Other compatibilists who share Frankfurt’s project of capturing the freedom 
required for moral responsibility without reference to alternative possibilities have 
offered a different conception of freedom from the freedom of self expression, one I shall 
call the freedom to respond to reasons.  According to the reasons-responsiveness picture, 
a person acts with the freedom required for moral responsibility to the extent that he 
 
27 Scanlon (1998) claims that knowing whether a person is morally responsible for his 
behavior consists in “determining whether a given action did or did not reflect that 
agent’s judgment-sensitive attitudes” (p. 290). Smith (2008) suggests that “to say that an 
agent is morally responsible for something, on this view, is to say that that thing reflects 
her rational judgment in a way that makes it appropriate, in principle, to ask her to defend 
or justify it” (p. 369). 
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regulates his behavior by moral reasons.  John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza (1998) 
and R. Jay Wallace (1994), among others, defend views of this type.  According to 
Fischer and Ravizza, whose view has been most influential, a person acts with the 
freedom required for moral responsibility if and only if the process that led to his action 
was responsive to moral reasons in the sense that, holding that process fixed, in some 
possible circumstance in which there were sufficient moral reasons to do otherwise, the 
individual would have recognized these reasons in an understandable way and would 
have acted differently for at least one of them.28  These reasons-responsiveness 
conditions threaten to undermine PAP in just the same way as self-disclosure views, since 
regulating one’s behavior by reasons does not require the freedom to do otherwise.29  So, 
if reasons-responsiveness is all the freedom needed for moral responsibility, then PAP 
would be false. 
 How might the sufficiency of these new compatibilist conditions be challenged?  
How, in other words, can PAP be defended in the face of them?  In a context in which 
what is at issue is whether or not moral responsibility requires the freedom to do 
 
28 Describing this condition, Fischer and Ravizza (1998) write, “a mechanism of kind K 
is moderately responsive to reasons to the extent that, holding fixed the operation of a K-
type mechanism, the agent would recognize reasons (some of which are moral) in such a 
way as to give rise to an understandable pattern (from a viewpoint of a third party who 
understands the agent’s values and beliefs), and would react to at least one sufficient 
reason to do otherwise (in some possible scenario)” (pp. 243-244).  (By ‘sufficient’ 
reason, Fischer and Ravizza mean a reason that is all-things-considered his best or 
strongest reason for action.)  Fischer and Ravizza have a further freedom–relevant 
requirement for moral responsibility, namely that a person must ‘take responsibility’ for 
the process that led to his action.  This additional condition makes no difference to the 
force of my criticism of their view. 
29 One might argue here that regulating one’s behavior by moral reasons does require 
some sort of freedom to do otherwise.  However, I set this concern aside in what follows. 
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otherwise, it would be straightforwardly question-begging against those who reject PAP 
to argue that these compatibilist views are not sufficient to capture the freedom required 
for moral responsibility precisely because they make no use of alternative possibilities.  
With this in mind, I want to outline and evaluate two prominent lines of argument in the 
literature that are designed to challenge the sufficiency of the new compatibilist 
conditions without falling into this question-begging charge.  One has to do with 
manipulation, while the other concerns the difference between causal and moral 
responsibility. 
 
6.2  Manipulation arguments.  
 Manipulation arguments, which have recently been defended by Robert Kane 
(1996) and Derk Pereboom (2001) among others, turn on the claim that people can be 
covertly manipulated by neuroscientists into satisfying the relevant compatibilist 
conditions.  However, being subject to this sort of manipulation is intuitively at odds with 
free and responsible action, and so these compatibilist conditions cannot be sufficient to 
capture the freedom needed for moral responsibility. 
 To illustrate, consider an example derived from Pereboom’s (2001) well-known 
case of Professor Plum.  Plum murders Ms. White for the sake of some personal 
advantage.  Causal determinism is true and Plum satisfies the new compatibilist 
conditions for the freedom required for responsibility that we have discussed.  His desire 
to kill White is his will because it was the will he wanted (Frankfurt’s condition).  His 
action reflects attitudes that are judgment-sensitive (Scanlon), judgments that are both 
rational (Smith) and represent Plum’s values (Watson).  Finally, his behavior is 
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responsive to reasons in the sense that holding the process that led to his action fixed, in 
some possible circumstance in which there were sufficient moral reasons to do otherwise, 
Plum would have recognized these reasons in an understandable way and would have 
acted differently for at least one of them (Fischer and Ravizza).   
However, unbeknownst to Plum, his satisfaction of these conditions was entirely 
due to the covert behavior of a team of neuroscientists who wanted to be sure that he 
would kill White.  They covertly manipulated him by interfering with the neural 
connections in his brain ensuring that he met these conditions.  This by itself implies that 
these compatibilist conditions are not sufficient to capture moral responsibility’s 
freedom.  Yet, in the face of the possible compatibilist reply that it is one thing for 
neuroscientists to manipulate a person but another thing for him to act in the ‘normal,’ 
unimpaired way, Kane, Pereboom, and others, take the argument further.  They claim that 
there are no morally relevant differences between a person who is determined by 
neuroscientists into meeting these conditions and one who is determined by the laws of 
nature and facts about the past into satisfying them.  If this is true, then people’s non-
responsibility in the manipulation case would transfer to any instance in which they 
satisfy the compatibilist conditions as a result of ‘mere’ causal determinism. 
The soundness of this kind of argument has recently been challenged by 
compatibilists.  In the next section of the chapter, I will assess this debate.  Before that, 
however, I want to consider a dialectical issue about using manipulation cases to argue 
that it is the absence of the freedom to do otherwise in the manipulation example that 
explains why Plum does not act freely and responsibly. 
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Manipulation arguments are standardly used by incompatibilists to argue that the 
new compatibilist conditions are not sufficient to capture the freedom required for moral 
responsibility.  However, what is interesting about these arguments is that the kinds of 
incompatibilists that develop them are not usually those who believe that PAP is true.  In 
fact, although incompatibilists use manipulation arguments as a way to undermine the 
sufficiency of the compatibilist conditions, they do not usually use them to support the 
claim that what is missing in these compatibilist accounts is the (incompatibilist) freedom 
to do otherwise.  Instead, Kane, Pereboom, and other so called source incompatibilists, 
use them to support their claim that “an action is free in the sense required for moral 
responsibility only if it is not produced by a deterministic process that traces back to 
causal factors beyond the agent’s control” (Pereboom, 2001: 3).  (Kane endorses a similar 
principle.)  On this line of thought, what explains our intuition that the manipulated 
individual does not act freely and responsibly is not that he lacks alternative possibilities 
per se but rather that his actions trace back to deterministic factors beyond his control, 
namely, the intentions and actions of the neuroscientists.  In other words, according to 
source incompatibilists, it is the fact that Plum is not the true source of his behavior rather 
than his lacking the freedom to do otherwise that explains why we have the intuition that 
he does not act freely and responsibly.  
 This use of the manipulation argument potentially undermines my defense of 
PAP.  After all, if sound, the argument would apparently undermine the sufficiency of the 
new compatibilist conditions at the expense of conceding that the freedom to do 
otherwise is not what is missing from these accounts and so not something that is 
necessary for moral responsibility.  However, I do not think that this is a serious 
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challenge to my defense of PAP.  Even if manipulation arguments were sound, I doubt 
whether this would be a strike against PAP because it is far from clear that manipulation 
cases only support a source-based version of incompatibilism.  After all, our intuition that 
the manipulated person does not act freely and responsibly might be best explained by the 
fact that the manipulation impedes his ability to do otherwise.  According to this thought, 
it is because manipulated Plum is unable to do otherwise, rather than the fact that his 
behavior traces back to the intentions of the neuroscientists, that explains why we regard 
him as lacking freedom and responsibility. 
However, I do not think that this dialectical issue needs to be settled because – as 
I now want to explain – compatibilists have developed a response to manipulation 
arguments that, at least in my view, challenges the decisiveness of these arguments.  If 
manipulation arguments are not decisive, then it would be a moot point whether or not 
they would succeed in undermining the new compatibilist conditions at the expense of 
conceding that alternative possibilities are not required for moral responsibility. 
 
6.3  The Dilemma response to manipulation arguments. 
 The soundness of manipulation arguments has recently been challenged by 
compatibilists.  Some reject the claim that there are no morally relevant differences 
between a manipulated individual and an unimpaired person (what Michael McKenna 
(2008b), following Kane (1996), calls a ‘soft-line’ reply).  Others argue that when 
manipulated in a particular kind of way it is plausible to think that a manipulated 
individual does act freely and responsibly after all (what McKenna (2008b) terms the 
‘hard-line’ reply).  One way to illustrate these two lines of reply is in terms of a dilemma.  
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I call this the dilemma response to the manipulation arguments.  Frankfurt (1975) 
originally developed the dilemma but it has been subsequently taken up, in one form or 
another, by Lynne Rudder Baker (2006), Fischer (2006), McKenna (2008b), and Watson 
(1999).  The dilemma turns on whether or not the manipulation is moment-to-moment or 
a one-time occurrence early in the individual’s life.   
 Thinking about the Plum example, one question we can ask is how the 
neuroscientists go about manipulating Plum into meeting the compatibilist conditions in 
the first place.  On the one hand – the first horn of the dilemma compatibilists pose in the 
face of these examples – we can imagine that neuroscientists manipulate Plum in a 
moment-to-moment or on-going basis.  In this case, they program “him to undertake the 
process of reasoning by which his desires are brought about and modified – directly 
producing his every state from moment to moment” (Pereboom, 2001: 112-113).  They 
do this by “pushing a series of buttons just before he begins to reason about his situation, 
thereby causing his reasoning to be rationally egoistic” (p. 113) which, in the situation, 
leads him to kill White.   
However, these compatibilists claim that this kind of programming does not 
undermine the sufficiency of the compatibilist conditions.  They argue that what explains 
why Plum does not act freely and responsibly is not that the compatibilist conditions are 
insufficient but that the moment-to-moment manipulation of the neuroscientists undoes 
the presence of background conditions of agency that all sides agree are needed for free 
and responsible action.  For instance, compatibilists and incompatibilists generally agree 
that in order for a person to act freely and responsibly it must be the case that he has the 
capacity to step back and critically evaluate his mental states.  However, the on-going 
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manipulation to which Plum is subject would prevent him from being able to assess his 
desires, motives, and values in this way since the neuroscientists would be directly 
inducing new states into him in a moment-to-moment basis.  (Frankfurt [1975] signals 
this by speaking of the neuroscientists’ manipulation as rendering a person little more 
than a “marionette” [p. 120].)  So, by this line of reasoning, Plum’s non-responsibility in 
the local manipulation scenario is attributable to his lack of basic agential capacities, 
capacities that are needed in order for him to act freely and responsibly.  Importantly, 
these capacities would be present were the action deterministically caused in the normal, 
unimpaired way, so we can mark a morally relevant difference between determination by 
neuroscientists and determination by natural causes. 
On the other hand – the second horn of the compatibilist defense – we can 
conceive of Plum being manipulated not in a ‘local,’ on-going way but, instead, as a one-
time occurrence earlier in his life.  At an earlier point in his life, the neuroscientists’ 
“programmed him to weigh reasons for action so that he is often but not exclusively 
rationally egoistic, with the result that in the circumstances in which he now finds 
himself,” he kills White while meeting the compatibilist conditions (Pereboom, 2001: 
114-115).  The fact that the neuroscientists’ programming is temporally remote rather 
than moment-to-moment removes the worries from the previous case about whether or 
not Plum possesses the right background conditions of agency that are necessary for free 
and responsible action.  In this kind of situation, Plum presumably retains the capacity to 
reflect on his desires and values since the manipulators would not be constantly inducing 
new states into him.   
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However, in these circumstances, compatibilists insist that it is no longer as clear 
that Plum does not act freely and responsibly.  As McKenna (2005b) puts it: 
… once the manipulation is so qualified that all an agent’s current time-slice 
compatibilist-friendly structures are properly installed through a process of 
manipulation, then the role of the manipulator begins to shrink into the 
background; we are simply left with a normal person who happened to be brought 
into existence in a very peculiar manner (p. 217). 
So long as the manipulation is remote enough not to impair the individual’s 
powers of critical assessment then, as Frankfurt (1975) urges, he “may become morally 
responsible, assuming that he is suitably programmed” (p. 120).  (Baker [2006], 
McKenna [2008b], and Watson [1999] have expressed agreement with Frankfurt on this 
point.)  What are we to make of this? 
 With respect to the remote Plum case, my intuitions clash with Frankfurt and the 
other compatibilists.  Intuitively, it seems to me, we would not be inclined to think that 
Plum acted freely and responsibly in killing White were we to discover that he was the 
victim of such manipulation, even if the manipulation was temporally remote.  In fact, I 
would argue that so long as the manipulation impaired Plum’s ability to do otherwise, 
then whether or not it was local or remote is irrelevant to the issue of his responsibility.  
 However, I realize that not everyone will share my intuition.  For those whose 
intuitions are not settled, compatibilists taking this apparently ‘hard line’ could make the 
claim that Plum acts freely and responsibly more plausible by drawing attention to the 
similarities between the remote manipulation case and those of a normal upbringing.  
After all, we are all to some degree products of our circumstances, our family 
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environment, our genetic inheritance, and so on.  Yet, we do not tend to think that these 
facts undermine our freedom and responsibility, so why should things be different in the 
case of someone whose conduct is fashioned by these neuroscientists rather than by the 
more usual formative circumstances? 
The growing tendency among compatibilists to question the intuition that Plum 
does not act freely and responsibly so long as the manipulation does not undermine his 
basic agency has led some to suggest that manipulation arguments fall into a “dialectical 
stalemate” (McKenna, 2008b: 145) implying that they are “unlikely to be a profitable 
interaction between compatibilists and incompatibilists” (King, 2009: 5).  While talk of a 
stalemate is perhaps too strong – as Pereboom (2008) points out, “that term connotes the 
idea that the game is over and there are no further moves to be made” (p. 169) – and 
while I myself do not share the compatibilist intuition that Plum acts freely and 
responsibly, I do think that the compatibilist dilemma response constitutes an effective 
challenge to the decisiveness of manipulation arguments.  In response to this, I want to 
look at other ways in which the new compatibilist conditions might be undermined in a 
way that does not fall into a clash of intuitions about particular cases.  In other words, I 
want to ask whether there is a way to move the manipulation argument forward in the 
face of this apparent intuitive clash.  To do this, I outline and evaluate a different 
argument against the new compatibilist conditions, one that has its roots in some work by 





6.4  Causal and moral responsibility. 
 Should a compatibilist question the intuition that the remotely manipulated 
individual does not act freely and responsibly, I think that there is a possible line of 
response to be found in some remarks by Wolf (1990).  We can argue that while the fact 
that a person’s action reflects his ‘real’ self or is responsive to reasons does seem to 
capture the idea that he is a genuine cause or author of what he does, this only gives rise 
to a kind of responsibility that is causal rather than moral in character, and the question of 
a person’s moral responsibility is different in kind from the casual question of whether or 
not the person brought about or ‘authored’ his behavior.  Wolf describes the 
responsibility here as being ‘superficial’ rather than ‘deep’ in kind, moral responsibility 
having a quality of depth not captured by these compatibilist views. 
Describing ‘real’ self views, Wolf (1990) argues that acknowledging that 
someone’s action reflects his ‘real’ self helps “identify the individual as playing a causal 
role that, relative to the interests and expectations provided by the context, is of special 
importance to the explanation of that event” (p. 40).  However, she claims that “when we 
hold an individual morally responsible for some event, we are doing more than 
identifying her particularly crucial role in the causal series that brings about the event in 
question.  We are regarding her as a fit subject for credit or discredit on the basis of the 
role she plays” (pp. 40-41). 
 Wolf tries to motivate the difference between causal and moral responsibility as 
follows: 
… it is intelligible to wonder whether a person is deeply responsible for an action 
even after we have removed all doubt that she really did perform that action.  We 
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can coherently acknowledge that a person really did play a relevantly crucial role 
in bringing a very good or very bad event about, and yet be uncertain about 
whether the person deserves to be praised or blamed for it (p. 41). 
 As I would put it, and broadening the criticism to apply to reasons-responsiveness 
views as well as to ‘real’ self theories, the causal question of being sure that someone did 
something is different in character from the moral question of whether the person 
deserves praise or blame for doing that thing.  So, even if we were sure that the person 
really performed the action – because, for instance, it reflects who he really is or is 
responsive to reasons – it would still be an open question whether he is blameworthy or 
praiseworthy for behaving as he did.  Knowing that people genuinely author their actions 
does not settle the matter as to whether they are morally responsible for them. 
 I think that this argument – what I call the causal responsibility argument – is 
very suggestive.  However, as I will explain shortly, it too falls short of being decisive 
because compatibilists have a response open to them that blunts much of its force.  
Before I outline this response, though, I want to first consider a different line of defense 
new compatibilists might make, one due to Watson (1996).  In my view, Watson’s 
defense is not compelling and new compatibilists would do better to adopt the line of 
reply I go on to suggest. 
 
6.5  Watson’s two faces of responsibility. 
 Against Wolf, Watson (1996) develops two main points.  First, he argues that 
when we properly understand ‘real’ self views – at least the type he favors – we see that 
they do give rise to a kind of responsibility that is moral and not simply causal in 
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character.  However, in his second point, he concedes to Wolf that the relationship 
between self-expression and moral responsibility is not quite so simple.  He argues that 
there is more than one kind – or ‘face,’ as he puts it – of moral responsibility.  While self-
expression is sufficient to capture the freedom required for one kind of moral 
responsibility, what he calls ‘attributability,’ there is a further kind of moral 
responsibility that he calls ‘accountability’ whose conditions of freedom outstrip self-
expression. 
 With respect to this first point, Watson argues that ‘real’ self views do capture a 
genuinely moral kind of responsibility.  In his view, it is a person’s considered values or 
“fundamental evaluative orientation” (p. 234) that constitutes his ‘real’ self or who he 
really is as a person.  Because of this, when people’s actions reflects their values, they 
can be morally evaluated – and hence morally responsible – in ways that bear upon their 
evaluative orientation.  In particular, they can be morally responsible in terms of what 
their actions reveal about the kind of moral agents they are.30  Watson gives an example 
of a thief stealing some books (pp. 230-231).  If the thief’s behavior is reflective of his 
values, then he can be evaluated in ways that bear upon his value judgments.  In this 
instance, by deciding to steal, the thief shows himself to be a bad, callous, or perhaps evil 
person.  “These appraisals,” Watson suggests, “concern the agent’s excellences and faults 
– or virtues and vices – as manifested in thought and action … [and so we can say that] 
such judgments are made from the aretaic perspective” (p. 231). 
 
30 It is unclear whether Frankfurt could make use of Watson’s defense here because, on 
Frankfurt’s view, a person’s identified desires – which comprise his ‘real’ self – have no 
necessary connection to his value judgments or conception of the good (see Frankfurt 
1971: 13, footnote 6). 
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 However, in his second main point, Watson argues that not all moral 
responsibility corresponds to this kind of aretaic or attributability responsibility.  There is 
a further kind – or ‘face’ – of moral responsibility called ‘accountability’ which has to do 
with the practice of “holding people morally accountable” (p. 230) for their behavior.  To 
hold someone morally accountable for his action is not merely to evaluate what his 
actions reveal about the kind of person he is; rather, it is to respond to him in further 
ways that are characteristic of holding people responsible – subjecting them to sanctions 
in the negative case (like censure or punishment) or provided them with benefits in the 
positive case (like public admiration or reward).  Furthermore, the kind of freedom 
needed for people to be accountable for what they do is not met when their actions reflect 
their ‘real’ selves.  In addition, Watson implies that a PAP-type condition applies to 
accountability in the sense that, at least in the negative case, people must have had a 
reasonable opportunity to avoid incurring sanctions in order for it to be fair for them to 
receive such treatment.31 
 Is Watson’s appeal to two faces of responsibility a good defense against the 
causal responsibility argument?  I do not think so.  The first question I would ask is 
whether attributability should be thought of as a kind of moral responsibility at all.  On 
the one hand, Watson is surely right that a when a person’s action reflects his values, he 
shows himself to be a particular kind of moral agent, and so evaluations of him will have 
a moral quality beyond mere causal assessment.  As Wallace (1994) puts it, “assessments 
 
31 In more recent work, Watson (2004) acknowledges that the PAP-type condition 
required for accountability “creates a foothold for incompatibilist doubts” (p. 10).  It is 
unclear from his remarks whether Watson sees self-expression as necessary for 
accountability.  I follow Smith (2008) in suggesting that he does. 
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of people as responsible, in the sense of being autonomously self-revealing in their 
actions, clearly go beyond mere descriptions of causal responsibility, and so may be said 
to have a quality of depth” (p. 53).   
In fact, I concede to Watson that some philosophers have not recognized that this 
point should be common ground.  Wolf (1990) herself argues that evaluating people in 
this way is no different in kind from the assessments we make of “earthquakes, defective 
tires, and broken machines” (p. 42).  She makes this claim on the basis that we can 
attribute the city’s destruction to the earthquake or the car’s failure to the damaged tire in 
just the same way that the actions of people can be genuinely attributed to them.  
However, her argument is surely wrong.  Full-fledged moral agents open themselves up 
to certain forms of moral criticism and evaluation when their actions reveal the kind of 
moral agents they are that are simply not applicable to earthquakes, tires, or even 
nonhuman animals and young children.  However, what is open to question and should 
not be common ground is whether these evaluations and this responsibility should be 
classed as a kind of moral responsibility.  Let me motivate this doubt. 
 All agree that there is a deep conceptual tie between moral responsibility on the 
one hand and moral praise and blame on the other.  Many claim, for instance, that to say 
a person is morally responsible for what he does is to say that he deserves moral praise or 
blame, in one form or another, for what he does.32  What is striking, though, is that 
judgments about the kind of moral agents people are – those judgments licensed by 
Watson’s condition of attributability – are different from, and do not seem describable in 
terms of, moral praise or blame.  After all, it is one thing to judge a thief to be a callous, 
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selfish, or evil person in virtue of what he did; it is another thing, however, to judge him 
blameworthy for acting as he did.  This difference reflects a natural picture according to 
which not all the moral assessments we can make of people bear on the question of their 
moral responsibility.  On this picture, the assessments that do bear on this question are 
those pertaining to a person’s blameworthiness or praiseworthiness.  And since the 
assessments licensed by ‘real’ self views are not reflective of moral praise or blame, they 
should not be thought of as judgments of moral responsibility. 
 Watson seems to be aware of this objection since he argues that ‘real’ self views 
do give rise to assessments that are a kind of moral praise and blame.  “In one way,” he 
writes, “to blame (morally) is to attribute something to a (moral) fault in the agent; 
therefore, to call conduct shoddy is to blame the agent” (pp. 230-231).  As he later puts it, 
“the aretaic perspective is a source of blaming judgments in one plain sense: judgments 
that the agent’s conduct was faulty in some way.  If the fault is moral, so is the blame” (p. 
238).  However, I do not share Watson’s intuition that to call a person’s conduct shoddy 
is to blame him in any moral sense.  At most, I see how one might argue that in calling 
someone’s behavior shoddy we might, in part, be judging that the action is a reflection of 
a moral failing on the individual’s part and he is, in this sense, ‘to blame’ for it.  
However, this is simply a causal use of the term blame.  To say that the person is ‘to 
blame’ for the action in this context is simply to say that he is the one to whom the failing 
can be attributed, as an exercise of his moral agency.  As such, any sense in which we 
might be tempted to speak of the evaluation of a person’s moral character as being a kind 
 
32 See, for example, Fischer and Ravizza (1998), Pereboom (2001), and Wolf (1990). 
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of blame or praise is best explained as being a causal sense of blame or praise rather than 
the moral kind or praise and blame that is at issue in contexts of moral responsibility. 
 Watson could, of course, just stipulate that judgments of attributability are 
describable in terms of moral praise or blame.  However, it is unclear how far this can 
take him.  Stipulating that assessments of a person’s moral character are kinds of moral 
praise or blame leaves little room for the possibility of moral evaluation of a person that 
is not a type of moral praise or blame.  This is surely not right.  We want to know how to 
divide up the moral assessments we make of people into those that pertain to moral praise 
and blame and those that do not.  We do not want to collapse this distinction entirely.33 
 So far, I have cast doubt on Watson’s claim that attributability, the sort of 
responsibility that ‘real’ self views apparently undergird, should be thought of as a kind 
of moral responsibility.  However, I now want to turn to a different criticism of Watson’s 
defense.  In particular, I would like to argue that even if we were to grant for the sake of 
argument that attributability does capture a genuinely moral kind of responsibility, there 
 
33 An alternative response Watson and his defenders could make in the face of my 
criticism is to reject the conceptual link that philosophers have generally drawn between 
moral responsibility on the one hand and moral praise and blame on the other.  If we 
relaxed this link, and broadened the scope of evaluations a person could be open to that 
bear on the question of his moral responsibility, then assessments of his character could 
be classed as judgments of moral responsibility whether or not they could be interpreted 
as forms of moral praise or blame.  Pereboom (Fischer, Kane, Pereboom & Vargas, 2007; 
Pereboom, 2008), for instance, follows Watson in speaking of there being different 
‘senses’ or ‘notions’ of moral responsibility, but unlike Watson he implies that some of 
these senses of responsibility do not give rise to moral praise or blame.  One of these is, 
what he calls, the ‘legitimately called to improvement’ sense, a kind of responsibility that 
closely matches what Watson has in mind with his idea of attributability.  A person is 
morally responsible in this sense if, among other things, she can be legitimately open to 
critical evaluation of “what her decisions and actions indicate about her moral character” 
(Fischer, Kane, Pereboom & Vargas, 2007: 86).  In response, I find it deeply unattractive, 
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are still reasons to think that his defense of ‘real’ self views is unsatisfactory.  This is 
because Watson admits that it is the other face of responsibility, accountability, rather 
than attributability that captures the “ordinary, full-fledged concept of moral 
responsibility” (p. 243).34  This is significant because new compatibilists have generally 
taken themselves to be after the same thing as PAP-defenders.  That is, both parties have 
been trying to articulate the kind of freedom with which people must act if they are to be 
morally responsible for their behavior in the ordinary, traditional sense of that term.  
However, by conceding that ‘real’ self views do not capture the freedom needed for this 
ordinary kind of moral responsibility, even those sympathetic to such views should find 
Watson’s defense less than satisfactory. 
 Finally, Watson tries to motivate his argument that attributability is a genuine 
kind of moral responsibility by arguing that it is “central to ethical life” (p. 243).  This is 
because making assessments about the kind of moral agents people are helps us settle our 
 
and a high price to pay to defend a theory, to give up the tight link between moral 
responsibility and praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. 
34 Pereboom (Fischer, Kane, Pereboom & Vargas, 2007) expresses similar sentiments.  
He claims that while the idea of moral responsibility as centered upon evaluations of a 
person’s moral character, the ‘legitimately called to improvement’ sense, for instance, 
“may be a bona fide sense of moral responsibility, it is not the one at issue in the free will 
debate.”  This is because “incompatibilists would not find our being morally responsible 
in this sense to be even prima facie incompatible with determinism.  The notion that 
incompatibilists do claim to be at odds with determinism is the one defined in terms of 
basic desert” (p. 86).  While I am sympathetic to Pereboom’s conclusion here, I do not 
think that he has quite captured the difficulty.  The point is not, as he suggests, that 
responsibility-as-character-assessment is not the sense of moral responsibility at issue 
because it is not defined in terms of basic desert simpliciter.  That notion may well be 
defined in terms of basic desert, in terms of whether or not a person deserves to be judged 
as being a particular kind of moral agent in virtue of his action.  Rather, the reason this 
notion is not the central one at issue is because it is not defined in terms of whether or not 
a person deserves to be judged morally praiseworthy or blameworthy for what he has 
done. 
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own convictions about “living a good human life” (p. 243) and, as he puts it in more 
recent work, they help us better form ideas about “the possible models of human 
achievement and failure” (2004: 10).  I am inclined to agree with Watson that our 
capacity to evaluate the moral character of ourselves and our fellow human beings is 
deeply significant.  However, I fail to see how this fact makes it any more plausible that 
these kinds of assessments should be thought of as bearing on the question of a person’s 
moral responsibility.  Why not simply insist that they are significant to our moral lives 
and be done with it? 
 
6.6  The Epistemic condition of moral responsibility. 
 In the previous section, I argued that Wolf’s argument is not undermined by 
Watson’s appeal to two faces of responsibility.  However, despite my sympathies with its 
aims, I do not think that the causal responsibility argument is ultimately decisive.  Just as 
compatibilists had a compelling response to the manipulation argument available to them, 
I also believe that they have a response to the causal responsibility argument that blunts 
its apparent force.  Let me explain. 
 Compatibilists and incompatibilists generally agree that acting with a certain kind 
of freedom is not the sole consideration in determining a person’s moral responsibility.  
In order to assess whether an individual is morally responsible for what he does, all sides 
agree that we should not only enquire about the freedom with which he acts.  We also 
need to ask whether he satisfies the relevant epistemic conditions for moral responsibility.  
Did he know what he was doing and what effects his actions would likely have?  If not, 
should he have known this?  Was his ignorance culpable?  It is common ground that as 
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well as knowing the freedom with which someone acts we also need to know details 
about the knowledge and beliefs he has when acting in order to assess whether or not he 
deserves praise or blame for what he does. 
 However, bringing to light the epistemic component of moral responsibility 
reveals a way for compatibilists to challenge the decisiveness of the causal responsibility 
argument.  As Wolf presented it, the argument is premised on the claim that the new 
compatibilist conditions are not sufficient to capture moral responsibility’s freedom 
because even if we are sure that the individual has met these conditions and so is causally 
responsible, we can still raise the further question of whether he is morally responsible 
for what he does.  Yet compatibilists should insist that the fact that the moral question 
remains open under these circumstances is exactly what we should expect.  So long as we 
do not yet have details about whether the person satisfies the relevant epistemic condition 
for moral responsibility (whatever this is), simply knowing the freedom with which he 
acts would not be enough – as both compatibilists and incompatibilists agree – to settle 
the question of whether he deserves praise or blame for his behavior.   
The mere fact that the moral question is open under these circumstances does not, 
therefore, show that the acting so as to reflect one’s ‘real’ self or in a way that is 
responsive to reasons is only sufficient to give rise to a kind of responsibility that is 
causal rather than moral in character.  The error in Wolf’s argument is to fail to 
appreciate that moral responsibility has two pertinent conditions – one having to do with 
freedom, the other concerning the individual’s epistemic state – and it is only when we 
have details about both of these conditions that the question of a person’s moral 
responsibility should be closed. 
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Chapter Seven: Undermining New Compatibilism II – Blame, Demands, and 
Authorship 
 
 In the previous chapter, I argued that two prominent arguments in the literature – 
the manipulation argument and the causal responsibility argument – do not decisively 
undermine the sufficiency of the new compatibilist conditions.  If my claims in the 
previous chapter are correct, then those who are sympathetic to PAP are faced with the 
question of how else the principle might be defended in the face of the new compatibilist 
challenge.  In this chapter, I develop a different way of defending PAP that brings to light 
and questions a traditional assumption about the relationship between freedom and moral 
responsibility. 
 
7.1  Blame, expectations, and demands. 
 I want to begin by outlining and defending an argument for PAP’s truth that 
draws on some recent remarks by David Widerker (2005).  I then go on in later sections 
of the chapter to show that, if sound, this Widerker-style argument has profound 
dialectical implications.  In particular, if sound, it represents a significant shift in our 
understanding of the relationship between freedom and moral responsibility, something 
that has so far gone unnoticed. 
 Several philosophers have recently drawn attention to the apparent link between 
moral blame and moral expectations or demands.  They have pointed out that there is an 
intuitive connection between blaming people on the one hand and expecting or, perhaps, 
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demanding things of them and their behavior on the other.  To cite one instance of this, 
consider Michael McKenna’s (2008a) claim that: 
When we blame a person for a moral wrong, a clear implication is that our moral 
charge includes the demand that the person not have done that, that the person 
have acted as morality requires (p. 783). 
The particular question I want to take up is how we can best capture the apparent 
relationship between these concepts.  Widerker (2005) suggests that the key idea here is 
that a person’s blameworthiness rests, in part, on it being reasonable for those in a 
position to do so to expect of him that he not have acted as he did.  He captures this 
insight with the following principle, which he calls the principle of alternative 
expectations (PAE): 
An agent S is morally blameworthy for doing A only if in the circumstances it 
would be morally reasonable to expect of S not to have done A.35 
However, the trouble with this principle is that the idea of expecting people to act 
in certain ways but not in others, in the sense Widerker intends, is not obvious and needs 
clarification.  Clearly, the sense of expectation he has in mind is not that of prediction.  
That is, to have expected a person not to have behaved as he did, in the peculiar sense 
Widerker is after, is not for us to have made a prediction about how we believe he would 
likely have acted.  Rather, for us to have expected a person not to have acted as he did is 
for us to have demanded or, perhaps, insisted that he not behave that way.  To use some 
 
35 By it being ‘morally reasonable’ to expect the person not to have acted as he did, 
Widerker points out that he means morally reasonable “for someone who is morally 
competent and knows all the relevant non-moral facts pertaining to the situation the agent 
is in” (p. 297, footnote 20). 
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examples, the sense of expectation at issue here is that we use when, in situations in 
which people are being dishonest, we expect or demand that they tell the truth, or in 
circumstances where people are keeping things that do not belong to them, we demand 
that they return what they owe. 
To avoid confusion about the notion of expectation that is relevant when it comes 
to a person’s blameworthiness, I want to rephrase Widerker’s principle in terms of 
demands rather than expectations.  For, as I have suggested, it seems to me that by 
speaking of expecting people to act in certain ways but not in others, Widerker wants to 
convey the thought that blameworthiness is linked to the reasonableness of demanding 
that people behave in these ways.  Let us call the revised principle the principle of 
alternative demands (PAD): 
An agent S is morally blameworthy for doing A only if in the circumstances it 
would be reasonable for those in a position to do so to demand that S not have 
done A. 
Having clarified the relevant notion of expectation by offering a revised version 
of Widerker’s original principle, I will now explain this principle’s importance.  As 
Widerker points out, this kind of principle is significant because, if true, it can be used to 
support the claim that moral responsibility, at least as it applies to blameworthiness, 
requires alternative possibilities.  It would therefore demonstrate that the new 
compatibilist conditions which do not make use of the freedom to do otherwise are not 
sufficient to capture the freedom required for moral blame.  To see this, consider the 
following claim.  If a person was not free to do otherwise when performing a wrong 
action, then it would not be reasonable to expect or demand that he not have acted as he 
 124
did.  For if the person lacked alternative possibilities, then to demand this of him would 
be to demand that he have done something “impossible,” as Widerker (p. 297) puts it, and 
have done something that it was not within his power to do.  Yet, it is surely 
unreasonable or unfair to expect or demand that an individual have done something if this 
thing – that is, not acting as he did – was not something that was within his power to do. 
According to this line of argument, in order for us to reasonably demand that a 
person not have behaved as he did, it must be the case that he had alternative possibilities.  
Furthermore, if the reasonableness, or fairness, of such a demand is a necessary condition 
for justified blame as PAD states, then we have an argument, against Frankfurt, Fischer, 
and the other new compatibilists, that blameworthiness requires the freedom to do 
otherwise after all. 
This argument – which I call the reasonable demand argument – is provocative.  
In the next section, I want to defend it against some criticisms as a way of clarifying the 
theoretical grounding on which it rests. 
 
7.2  Defending and motivating the argument. 
 I see two main ways in which the reasonable demand argument might be 
challenged.  First, critics might argue that, contrary to one of the argument’s premises, it 
is not unreasonable or unfair to demand that people who lacked alternative possibilities 
not have acted as they did.  Perhaps, so the thought goes, it can be reasonable to make 
demands of how people behave even if it is not within their power to meet these 
demands.  In other words, to retool a more familiar slogan about ‘ought,’ the critic is 
challenging the claim that ‘demand-implies-can’. 
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 But I doubt that this response has much force.  In fact, I am inclined to think that 
the only reason that critics would suggest it or claim to find it plausible is if they already 
had a prior commitment to PAP’s falsity.  After all, it seems deeply plausible to think that 
such demands would not be reasonable under these circumstances.  How can it be 
reasonable or fair to demand that someone not have acted as he did if this was not 
something that it was within his power to do?  At any rate, I want to set this criticism 
aside and assess a second, more promising line of attack. 
 A second line that critics could take to undermine the argument is to challenge the 
truth of the principle on which it rests – that is, to reject PAD itself.  In a recent paper, 
Justin Capes (2009) offers what he takes to be a criticism of Widerker’s original 
principle, PAE, which, by extension, could also be used to challenge my revised version 
of it, PAD.  He writes: 
The Frankfurt-defender, I am suggesting, has been given no reason to accept this 
claim [i.e., Widerker’s claim that a person is blameworthy only if it would be 
reasonable to expect him not to have acted as he did].  Why must we expect [or 
demand] a person to do otherwise in order to disapprove morally of his behavior?  
It seems entirely possible to disapprove of a person’s behavior and indeed to hold 
that person blameworthy for what she has done without there being an expectation 
[or demand] on our part that she not have behaved in that way.  To be sure, we 
will no doubt wish that the person not have behaved as she did, and we may judge 
that the person ought not to have behaved that way, but … this needn’t involve an 
expectation or demand on our part that the person not behave as she did (p. 15). 
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Capes is attempting to question the truth of Widerker’s original principle – and, 
by extension, my revised version of his principle – on the grounds that we can blame 
people for what they do without apparently making any expectations or demands of them 
at all.  But once we bring to bear a simple distinction we see that Capes’ criticism is off-
target and is no threat to the claim that blameworthiness requires the reasonableness of an 
expectation or demand.  He mistakenly equates Widerker’s principle with the stronger 
claim that blame involves an expectation or demand that the person not have acted as he 
did.36  Yet these are distinct claims.  In fact, the claim that blameworthiness requires that 
it must be reasonable to expect or demand that someone not behave as he did does not 
entail that his blameworthiness involves such an expectation or demand. 
Pointing out that a person can appear blameworthy without an expectation or 
demand being made of him is not, therefore, a good criticism of either Widerker’s 
original principle or my revised version.  In fact, Widerker can admit that a reason for 
preferring his principle over the stronger claim that Capes mistakenly attributes to him – 
the claim that blame involves an expectation or demand – is precisely because it seems 
far more conceivable to blame an individual without demanding or expecting anything of 
him than it does to conceive of blaming him without it being reasonable to form a 
demand or expectation of him should we wish to. 
While Capes’ criticism misses the mark, I do think that there is room to question 
Widerker’s own account of what explains the attractiveness of his principle (and, by 
extension, what would explain the appeal of my revised version of it).  At one point in his 
 
36 The stronger claim suggested in Capes’ remarks is this: The blameworthiness of an 
agent S for doing A essentially involves an expectation or demand that S not have done A. 
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paper, Widerker (2005) suggests that the appeal of his principle stems from the 
commonsense idea that “when we consider someone morally blameworthy for a certain 
act, we do so because we believe that morally speaking he should not have done what he 
did” (p. 296).  However, there are reasons to doubt this explanation of why his principle 
(or my revised version of it) is attractive.  This is because on the most natural reading of 
what it means to believe that someone should not have acted as he did, the fact that we 
blame a person because we believe this about him does not in fact support his principle 
(or my revised version) at all. 
 To illustrate, consider a case in which an individual, Jones, lies for some personal 
gain.  Suppose we believe that Jones should not have lied.  What is it that we believe?  
On the most natural construal, to believe that Jones should not have lied is to believe that, 
morally speaking, he ought not to have lied – that is, that he had a moral obligation not to 
lie which he violated through his action.  However, if this is what is meant by our belief 
that Jones should not have lied, then it is far from clear that this belief supports the claim 
that it would be reasonable to expect or demand that Jones not have lied.  This is because 
not only is the fact that, morally speaking, a person ought not to have done something 
distinct from the fact that it would be reasonable to expect or demand that he not have 
done it; it is also the case that believing that, morally, he ought not to have done it does 
not entail that it would be reasonable to expect or demand that he not have behaved that 
way. 
Curiously, Widerker (2005) himself recognizes this difference and lack of 
entailment.  However, he does not apparently appreciate the effect this has on 
undermining his claim about what explain his principle’s appeal.  In his paper, Widerker 
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provides an example in which though it is the case that, morally speaking, a person ought 
not to have done what he did, the particular circumstances entail that it is not reasonable 
to expect or demand of him that he not have acted that way.  He describes an individual 
who promised to return a book to a friend by a certain time but, because of circumstances 
beyond his control, is unable to do so (p. 303).  Widerker argues that the fact that he 
cannot return the book does nothing to remove the person from his moral obligation to 
return it by the particular time.  After all, the person might say, “I know I ought to return 
it, but I can’t do so.”  However, this fact does ensure that it would not be reasonable to 
expect or demand that he not have acted as he did and instead give back the book because 
this was not something that it was within his power to do. 
I suspect that part of Widerker’s error here is to think that he needs to explain the 
attractiveness of his principle by showing how it is apparently entailed by facts about 
why we consider people to be blameworthy for what they do.  But I do not think that 
there is any need for him to do this in order to show that his principle is appealing.  
Instead, why can’t we just say that his principle (or my revised version of it) is attractive 
because it offers a natural and compelling way of capturing the intuitive connection that 
exists between moral blame on the one hand and moral expectations or demands on the 
other?  It is unclear to me why the appeal of his principle would need any more 
explanation than this.37 
 
37 As I suggested earlier, Widerker can argue that his principle is more attractive than a 
similar, but stronger, claim about the relationship between blame and expectations or 
demands – namely, that a person’s blameworthiness involves an expectation or demand 
that he not act as he did – on the following grounds: it is more conceivable to blame an 
individual without demanding or expecting anything of him than it is to conceive of 
blaming him without it being reasonable to form a demand or expectation of him. 
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7.3  The Authorship assumption. 
 Having outlined and defended the reasonable demand argument, I now want to 
make good on an earlier claim I suggested and explain why this argument is so significant 
in recasting the traditional debate about freedom and responsibility.  The argument is 
important in this respect because it draws attention to what I see as a traditional 
assumption about the relationship between freedom and moral responsibility.  Let me 
explain. 
 While philosophers have paid a great deal of attention to the issue of what kind of 
freedom people must act with in order to be morally responsible for what they do, far less 
attention has been paid to the important, but neglected, question of why freedom is even 
an issue when it comes to determining a person’s moral responsibility.  Why is it 
apparently the case that people must act with a certain kind of freedom in order to merit 
praise or blame for their behavior?  In my view, the usual, or assumed, answer to this 
question reflected in most of the work on freedom and responsibility is that the issue of a 
person’s freedom is relevant to determining his moral responsibility simply because 
people must act with a certain kind of freedom in order for them to bring about or 
‘author’ their actions, moral responsibility requiring this kind of authorship.  On this 
view, once we figure out the kind of freedom with which a person must act in order for 
his behavior to be attributable to him, there are no more freedom-relevant questions that 
need to be asked, no more reasons to be interested in his freedom, in order to determine 




                                                
The Authorship Assumption: 
The issue of a person’ freedom as it pertains to his moral responsibility is simply 
the issue of determining the kind of freedom needed for him to bring about or 
author what he does.38 
 Reflecting a commitment to this assumption, the traditional battle between those 
who accept PAP and those who reject it has centered upon whether or not people must 
have alternative possibilities in order for their actions to be attributable to them.  On the 
one hand, PAP-adherents have generally argued that the reason that moral responsibility 
requires the freedom to do otherwise is because unless people meet a genuine fork in the 
road when acting, their behavior cannot truly be said to be something they brought about 
or authored.  On this view, it is only when people have the freedom to do otherwise that 
they can leave their distinctive mark or ‘stamp’ on the world, and so only then that their 
behavior can be fully theirs.   
 To give just one instance of this justification for PAP, consider Keith Wyma’s 
(1997) example from his childhood of when he learned to ride a bike.  When he first rode 
the bike without assistance, it was, he writes, “because I had the leeway to falter but did 
not do so, [that] the success of riding was truly mine” (p. 68).  According to Wyma, what 
made it the case that the bike-riding was something he did, an event that could properly 
attributed to him, was that he had the freedom to do otherwise – the freedom to fall over, 
for instance.  Without this sort of freedom, Wyma (and the majority of other PAP-
 
38 As I mentioned a few sentences ago, the authorship assumption rests on a background 
claim – which I will accept, for the sake of argument – that a person can be morally 
responsible only for actions that are attributable to him, only for actions of which he is 
the author.  
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defenders) argue that his bike-riding success would not be something he really did, and 
so could not be something for which he could be praised. 
 However, on the other hand, a natural way to look at the new compatibilist 
conditions of Frankfurt, Fischer, Watson, and others, is as different ways of developing 
the claim that people can author their behavior without possessing the freedom to do 
otherwise.  I think that it is plausible to argue that the reason these compatibilists draw a 
difference between those occasions when a person’s actions reflect his ‘real’ self and 
those times when they do not, and between those times when his behavior is responsive 
to reasons and those occasions when it is not, is as a way to capture the sense in which 
people’s actions can sometimes be attributed to them as things they did, things they fully 
brought about.  
 Derk Pereboom (2001) gestures at a similar interpretation of these compatibilist 
conditions.  He describes them as attempts to “tie moral responsibility to actions that are 
in some way or the other causally integrated with features of an agent’s psychology” (p. 
100).  We can push Pereboom’s interpretation further and ask why compatibilists would 
be interested in developing this kind of integration at all.  In my view, the natural answer 
is that they want to capture the sense in which people can bring about or author their 
actions without possessing the freedom to do otherwise.39 
 
39 Appealing to the authorship assumption helps to make sense of some remarks in a 
recent paper by Fischer (2006).  Calling the freedom to do otherwise ‘regulative control,’ 
and the other kinds of freedom not reliant on alternative possibilities ‘guidance control,’ 
Fischer seeks to “provide a measure of intuitive support for the claim that guidance 
control is all the control (or freedom) necessary for moral responsibility” (p. 107) by 
attempting to “identify … the ‘picture’ that supports the claim that guidance control, and 
not regulative control, is required for moral responsibility” (p. 117).  He argues that those 
who argue that PAP is true are motivated by, what he calls, the ‘making a difference’ 
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However, the fact that both those who accept PAP and those who reject it have 
tended to accept the authorship assumption has led to a stalemate with respect to 
establishing PAP’s truth or falsity.  For it is unclear how to settle the question of whether 
the freedom to do otherwise is required for people to author their behavior without falling 
into a battle of competing intuitions.  That is, naturally-inclined PAP-rejecters will find 
the new compatibilist conditions an attractive way of tying an individual to his actions, 
while PAP-sympathizers will insist that without meeting a genuine fork in the road, 
people cannot really author what they do. 
It is in this context that the reasonable demand argument is so important.  It, and 
the principle on which it rests, PAD (the principle that a person is blameworthy only if it 
would be reasonable to demand that he not have acted as he did), puts PAP-defenders in a 
position of strength.  It offers them a way to sidestep the controversy about whether the 
 
picture.  That is, the intuition that drives their accounts of moral responsibility is that 
“being morally responsible involves making a certain sort of difference to the world.  If 
you make a difference, in this sense, you select which path the world will take, among 
various paths that are genuinely available.  Your selection determines which way the 
world goes, and you thereby make a crucial difference” (p. 121).  However, the ‘making 
a difference’ intuition of moral responsibility is not available to new compatibilists for 
they deny that responsibility requires the freedom to do otherwise.  Instead, Fischer 
suggests that these compatibilists are motivated by a different intuitive picture of 
responsibility on which it is ‘making a statement,’ rather than making a difference, that is 
crucial for morally responsible action.  On this alternative view, responsibility is a matter 
of making a statement in the sense that a person “engage[s] in a particular kind of self-
expression” (p. 117) when he acts.  However, I suspect that the reason each party might 
talk about making a difference or making a statement in the first place is simply as a way 
to capture the sense in which morally responsible individuals truly author what they do.  
That is, I think that if PAP-sympathizers do think of themselves as motivated by the 
intuition that responsible agents ‘make a difference’ to the world, they do so because they 
think that difference-making is required for authorship of one’s actions.  On the other 
hand, if Fischer is right to think that new compatibilists are motivated to describe moral 
responsibility in terms of ‘making a statement,’ or self-expression, they do so because 
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freedom to do otherwise is required for authorship of one’s behavior.  In fact, armed with 
the reasonable demand argument, PAP-adherents can grant, for the sake of argument, that 
the new compatibilist conditions do capture the freedom required for people’s actions to 
be attributed to them without thereby conceding that blameworthiness does not require 
alternative possibilities.  For PAD shows that the authorship assumption is false, and 
there is more to delineating the freedom required for moral blame than simply 
determining the freedom needed for people to bring about their actions.  In particular, in 
order for a person to be blameworthy, we must also ask whether he acted with sufficient 
freedom for it to be reasonable to demand that he not have acted as he did.  As we saw 
earlier, in order for this kind of demand to be fair or reasonable, it must the case that the 
individual could have done otherwise.   
In other words, the reasonable demand argument’s significance rests on the fact 
that even if we were to grant new compatibilists the claim that people can author their 
behavior without the freedom to do otherwise, this would not show that alternative 
possibilities are not needed for blame.  For, as the argument shows, there is a further 
reason to think about the freedom with which a person acts when determining his 
blameworthiness than simply whether he acts with enough freedom to author his 
behavior.  Moreover, this additional freedom consideration – of whether the individual 
acts with sufficient freedom for it to be reasonable to demand that he not have acted that 
way – supports the claim that moral blame really does require alternative possibilities 
after all, whether or not it is also needed for people to author what they do.  With its 
 
they think that statement-making is all that is needed for people’s actions to be truly 
attributed to them as things they bring about. 
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rejection of the authorship assumption, the dialectical move involved in the reasonable 
demand argument represents a significant shift not only in defenses of PAP but also in 
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